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INTRODUCTION
Throughout Israel's turbulent history, not a week has gone by without her
being a focus of world attention.' The situation of Israeli women, however, has
rarely captured the spotlight. In most fields of law, Israeli women enjoy a
strong suite of rights and an egalitarian status compared to their sisters in other
nations. 2 However, in the domain of divorce law, women are subject to a
blatantly discriminatory regime, in which their strictly-limited right to obtain a
divorce is grossly inferior to the corresponding right held by Israeli men.
Israeli law accords Orthodox rabbinical courts exclusive control over
marriage and divorce, and those courts in turn grant full control over divorce to
men.3 No one-not the government, not the courts, not even a rabbi-is
1. Roger 1. Zakheim, Israel in the Human Rights Era: Finding a Moral Justification for the Jewish
State, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1005, 1031 (2004).
2. See RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 20, 24-65 (2004);
Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A Comparative Assessment of the Impact of Bills of
Rights in Canada and Israel, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 311-16 (2005); S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in
Israel and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights and the
Potentialfor Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 160-62, 183 (1997).
3. The Israeli courts, unique among modem legal systems, combine both civil and religious
institutions. While the civil courts have jurisdiction over most legal questions, religious courts retain
exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of family law. Israelis must thus move between two completely
different judicial systems, depending on the legal issue that brings them into court. For Jews, the
religious courts, known as the rabbinical courts, retain exclusive jurisdiction over matters of marriage
and divorce. See The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, S.H. 165 arts.
1-2. The civil system of family courts has parallel jurisdiction to handle questions of custody, child
support, property distribution, and all matters not related to the narrow issue of getting married or
divorced. See The Family Court Law, 1995, S.H. 393 arts. 1, 3-4; see also Dan Arbel & Joshua
Gaifman, The Family Court Act 1995, 43 HAPRAKLIT 431 (1997) (providing an instructive overview of
the family court and its functions).
The concurrent jurisdiction has produced a "race to the courthouse" phenomenon, whereby men
try to raise issues in the rabbinical court, which is generally more favorable to men, while women try to
win jurisdiction in the family court, which is generally a more women-friendly court. Menashe Shava,
The Relationship Between the Jurisdiction of the Family Court and the Jurisdiction of the Rabbinical
Court, 44 HAPRAKLIT 44 (1998).
The rabbinical court system consists of trial courts (regional rabbinical courts) and an appellate
court (the High Rabbinical Court). For a general discussion of the rabbinical court's origins, jurisdiction,
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authorized to divorce a couple except for the husband. The judicial act of
divorce is not constitutive, but merely declarative-the rabbinical court can
merely declare that the husband must divorce his wife, and in limited instances,
can apply coercive measures in hopes of persuading the husband to grant the
divorce.4 This leaves wives estranged from their husbands yet unable to
remarry due to their legal inability to terminate their present marriages. Such
women are called agunot: "chained" wives.
5
While divorce law has remained stagnant, the opposite is true of Israeli
constitutional law. For nearly half a century, Israel had no constitution. In the
last decade of the twentieth century, however, the nation experienced a
constitutional revolution. The Supreme Court, by means of a decision in an
ordinary case, transformed existing legislation and effectively created a formal
constitution with American-style judicial review.6 Thus, while other nations
may debate the proper interpretation and scope of their constitutions-Israel
also debates whether its Constitution actually exists.
Its lack of publicity and prominence notwithstanding, the new Constitution
has swept through Israel's legal landscape, leaving a substantial mark
throughout Israeli law, with a notable exception: divorce law. 8 Though the field
administration, and procedures, see HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 233; M. Chigier, The
Rabbinical Courts in the State of Israel, 2 ISR. L. REV. 147 (1967); and Natan Lerner, Religious Liberty
in the State of Israel, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 239, 254-55 (2007). On the Orthodox hegemony in
Israeli law, see Gidon Sapir, Law or Politics: Israeli Constitutional Adjudication as a Case Study, 6
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 184-87 (2001).
4. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 236-37; J. David Bleich, Modern Day Agunot: A
Proposed Remedy, 4 JEWISH L. ANN. 167, 171 (1981); see Heather Lynn Capell, After the Glass Has
Shattered: A Comparative Analysis of Orthodox Jewish Divorce in the United States and Israel, 33 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 331, 337 (1998); Erica R. Clinton, Chains of Marriage: Israeli Women's Fight for Freedom,
3. J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 289 (1999).
5. This term was originally used for galley slaves whose arms and legs were bound together (the
singular of agunot is aguna). For the definition of aguna, see M. Chigier, Ruminations Over the Agunah
Problem, 5 JEWISH L. ANN. 207, 210-11 (1981); and Clinton, supra note 4, at 295-96. See also Mark
Washofsky, The Recalcitrant Husband: The Problem of Definition, 5 JEWISH L. ANN. 144 (1981)
(noting that in the history of Jewish law, the problem of the agunot has been the greatest challenge to
basic equity).
6. CA 6821093 Unified Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Collective Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 407; see
Gal Dor, Constitutional Dialogues in Action: Canadian and Israeli Experiences in Comparative
Perspective, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000).
7. For discussion of the debate over the Israeli Constitution, see Ruth Gavison, The Constitutional
Revolution: A Reality, or a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?, 28 MISHPATIM 21, 31, 73 (1997). An adult Israeli
may be entirely unaware that her country even has a constitution. Indeed, the people were not consulted
or even aware of its preparation and some have accused the Court of acting behind the nation's back.
See, e.g., Klod Klein, The Silent Constitutional Revolution, MAARIV, Mar. 27, 1992; see also Joshua
Segev, Who Needs a Constitution? In Defense of the Non-Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel,
70 ALA. L. REV. 409, 411, 473 (2007). Chief Justice Barak himself conceded that "it is true that no
special appeal was made to the public to approve the text of the Basic laws." CA 6821/93 Unified Bank
Mizrahi, at 448.
8. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System As a Result of the
Basic Laws and Its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 1 (1997); G.
Bameha, Judicial Review Over Economic Legislation by Virtue of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, 12 MIsIM 80 (1998); Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The
Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 643-44 (2001); Gavriella Shalev, The Impact
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on Contract Law, I KIRYAT HA'MISHPAT 41 (2001);
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has garnered enormous scholarly attention from a multitude of legal, social,
psychological, and economic angles,9 the constitutional dimensions of divorce
remain virtually untouched.I0
The current study seeks to fill this academic lacuna and explore the missing
constitutional component of Israeli divorce law. Analyzing the Israeli marital
dissolution regime through a constitutional prism, it enlists this new framework
to support women's rights, enrich scholarly and political discourse, and equip
Israel's policymakers with a new tool to secure women's divorce entitlements
and facilitate their fight for equal marital emancipation.
To fulfill this end, the discussion is composed of three distinct Parts. The
first is a brief sketch of Israeli divorce law, the harm to women that results from
its inequity, and current proposals for reform. The second provides an outline
of Israel's unique constitutional landscape, including the birth, scope, and core
principles of the Constitution. The third examines the interplay of these two
areas of law, argues that the freedom to obtain a divorce is a fundamental right
deserving constitutional protection, and explores the implications of such a
right for both current divorce law and future reforms.
I. JEWISH DIVORCE, ISRAELI-STYLE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Divorce can be one of the most devastating experiences that an individual
faces in a lifetime. For an Israeli woman, the devastation is exacerbated; in
addition to emotional and financial trauma, she stands to endure legal trauma as
well, due to Israel's peculiar implementation of the Jewish vision of divorce.
Judaism has always accepted the institution of divorce as essential to
ending and burying moribund marriages. It is, however, viewed as an
unfortunate necessity, so undesirable that the Bible describes it as the exclusive
privilege of men. According to Biblical rules, men have an absolute, unilateral,
no-fault right to repudiate their spouses at any time, for reasons serious or
cavalier, through a get, a Jewish divorce decree.11 Subsequent rabbinical
developments have sought both to provide women with a limited fault-based
divorce right and to equalize the divorce prerogative by abridging a husband's
freedom to divorce his wife against her will. 12 Thus, according to current
Menashe Shava, The Quality and Administration ofAlimony--Is It Possible To Employ the Principles of
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty?, 23 IYUNEI MISHPAT 775 (2000); A. Yuren, The Constitutional
Revolution in Tax in Israel, 23 MISHPATIM 55 (1994).
9. See, e.g., BoAZ KRAUS, DIVORCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DIVORCE (1998); ESTER SWAN,
DIVORCE IN ISRAEL AND THE STATUS OF THE WOMAN (2002); JACOB SLOSER, A MAN'S RIGHTS IN THE
FAMILY? (1996).
10. See authorities cited infra Part I.
11. The rules relating to divorce are set forth in Deuteronomy 24:1-4. See MOSHE MEISELMAN,
JEWISH WOMEN IN JEWISH LAW 98 (1978).
12. The push for equality in divorce law reached its climax in 1000 C.E., when the uninhibited
freedom of husbands to sever marriage ties was finally abridged. Rabbeinu Gershom recognized that a
law giving husbands the unilateral right to divorce left women prey to arbitrary abandonment. He
[Vol. 20:441
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Jewish-Israeli law, either spouse may be released from the marriage upon
establishing a recognized divorce ground; otherwise, mutual consent is the sole
marital outlet.'
3
However, despite this seemingly sex-blind approach, divorce law remains
unequal in both its theory and application. As described in the following
sections, modem rabbinical divorce law merely made facial discrimination
more subtle, providing an insubstantial guarantee of equality. The divorce
regime continues to display a systematic and prominent predisposition in favor
of men, licensing them to enchain their wives indefinitely. Men have more
grounds through which they can obtain divorce, and it is easier for them to
establish those grounds and to persuade the court that they are severe enough to
warrant freedom. Men are also the sole beneficiaries of processes that carry
benefits for new relationships: remarriage permits when their spouses oppose
divorce and civil alternatives when such permits are not available. All of these
inequalities embedded in the divorce regime lead in turn to the ugly and
widespread phenomenon of get extortion.
A. Asymmetrical Divorce Grounds and Their Biased Application
The availability of divorce grounds in rabbinical court jurisprudence is
asymmetrical. Men have more grounds for divorce at their disposal and more
latitude in establishing those grounds. For example, because there is a religious
obligation upon men, but not women, to procreate, a wife's infertility creates a
solid claim for divorce, while a husband's sterility secures a right to divorce
only in narrow circumstances. 14 Bias also guides treatment of adultery: Even
suspicion of a wife's infidelity is a husband's divorce trump card, but a man's
established and repeated adultery rarely constitutes grounds for his wife's
freedom. 15 Insanity or mental illness-classic divorce grounds in both Western
and Islamic systems-are available to Jewish men as grounds for divorce, but
decreed, "To assimilate the right of the woman to the right of the man, it is ordained that even as the
man does not put away his wife except of his own free will, so shall the woman not be put away except
by her own consent." Rabbeinu Gershom's revolutionary decree in Responsa Asheri, 42, 1. For the
decree, see Elimelech Vestrich, Protection of the Status of the Jewish Woman in Israel-Intersection
Between Legal Traditions of Different Communities, 7 PLILIM 273, 284-89 (1998). This decree is still
valid and is a basic tenet of Jewish divorce law. See Bleich, supra note 4, at 168; Shahar Lifshitz,
Equality in Marriage, the Right to Divorce, and Autonomy of Communities, 27 IYUNEI MISHPAT 139,
163-65 (2003).
13. See ARIEL ROZEN-TZvI, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL: BETWEEN HOLY AND SECULAR 406-14
(1990); PINCHAS SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 421-24 (2d ed. 1995).
14. A woman may be entitled to divorce based on her husband's barrenness, but only if she can
establish that having children is critical for her. See BEN ZHION SHARSHEVSKI, FAMILY LAW 298-300
(4th ed. 1994); Elimelech Vestraich, Men's Suits for Infertility in the Rabbinical Courts' Decisions, 25
MISHPATIM 241 (1995).
15. SHARSHEVSKI, supra note 14, at 317-20; see Ruth Halperin, Adultery of the Husband as a
Ground for Divorce, 7 MECHKAREI MISHPAT 279, 322 (1989). See also the rabbinical court decision in
Case No. 059133397-21-I, in 18 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN
FAMILY MATTERS 11-12 (2008).
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they cannot free women.16 Similarly, a spouse's absence or disappearance is
never a divorce ground for women, while an abandoned husband can easily be
released. 17
Even when the same grounds are available to both sexes in theory, 18 in
practice the rabbinical court is far more willing to grant divorces to men than to
women. 19 This bias stems from a basic tenet of Jewish divorce law: A get must
be given of a husband's free will. If forced, the get is invalid, 20 and grave
consequences ensue for a woman and her children born after the invalid get
was obtained. 21 However, if a woman is forced to divorce, no such risks exist
22for her husband. Consequently, a woman must do more than a man to satisfy
the court of the presence and severity of circumstances creating grounds for
marital dissolution.23 In fact, Israeli women of the twenty-first century may find
it difficult to divorce consistent non-providers, adulterers, and even violent and
abusive partners. 24 In one extreme case, a woman spent seventeen years
convincing the rabbinical court that she was entitled to divorce, even though
her husband habitually beat both her and her children and repeatedly broke his
16. Once insane, a man is not legally competent to give his wife a get, but if a man is well enough
to divorce his wife, his condition is not sufficient grounds for divorce. Talmud Yebamot 14, 1.
17. ROZEN-TzVi, supra note 13, at 143-73; Marc S. Cwik, The Agunah Divorce Problem in Jewish
Society: Exploring the Possibility of an International Law Solution, 17 WiS. INT'L L.J. 109, 114, 116-17
(1999). Currently, eight hundred Israeli women whose husbands have disappeared or become mentally
incompetent are in legal limbo. Capell, supra note 4, at 337.
18. Divorce grounds that are identical for both sexes include defects and chronic disease, failure or
refusal to have sexual relations, refusal to live in the location agreed upon at the time of marriage,
violation of Mosaic law (a woman who makes her husband violate the commandments of the Torah),
and violation of Jewish religion (a woman who violates modesty rules that are not written in the Torah
but that are customary among Jewish women). See DAVID WERNER AMRAM, THE JEWISH LAW OF
DIVORCE ACCORDING TO BIBLE AND TALMUD 63-77 (2d ed. 1968); SHARSHEVSKI, supra note 14, at
308-25.
19. Bleich, supra note 4, at 172 (noting the rabbinical courts' hesitancy to compel a husband to give
a get); Irwin H. Haut, "The Altar Weeps ": Divorce in Jewish Law, in WOMEN IN CHAINS 45, 53 (Jack
Nusan Porter ed., 1995) (attributing the courts' reluctance to order divorce to their endorsement of the
minority Halachic opinion of Rabenu Tam that disapproved of divorce under most circumstances); see
also HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 236-37 (observing that divorce grounds against women are
easily accepted while the same claims against men rarely end in divorce); Pinchas Shifman, Jewish
Halacha in a Changing Reality: What Delays the Get-Delayed Women?, 6 ALEI MISHPAT 27, 43-44
(2007).
20. ERWIN E. SCHEFIrELOWITZ, THE JEWISH LAW OF FAMILY AND INHERITANCE AND ITS
APPLICATION IN PALESTINE 111 (1947).
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. According to biblical law, a man may marry an additional wife, and thus even if the get is
invalid, both the subsequent marriage and children of that marriage are legitimate according to the
Torah. SHARSHEVSKI, supra note 14, at 332.
23. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 237; Zerach Verhaphtig, Compulsion of a Get in Theory
and Practice, 3 SHNATON HAMISPHAT HAIVRI 153, 157-159, 209-215 (1976). For the problems
divorcing women face in the rabbinical courts, see Rivka Lovitch, Women Plaintiffs in Rabbinical
Courts: The Struggle to Solve the Problems of Mesoravot Get-Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,
http://www.idi.org.il/sites/english/BreakingTheNews/Pages/WomenP]aintiffsinRabbinicalCourts.aspx
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
24. See, e.g., HCJ 1371/96 Rephaeli v. Rephaeli [1997] lsrSC 51(1) 198; Mordechai Frishtic,
Physical Violence of Husbands as a Ground for Divorce in Jewish Law and Rabbinical Adjudication, 17
DINEI ISR. 83 (1994).
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promises, made in court, to end the abuse. Only after the husband was
convicted of murder and six counts of rape was the rabbinical court willing to
issue a compulsory divorce order.
25
B. Unequal Religious Alternatives Faced by a Chained Spouse
When a woman refuses to obey a divorce order issued by the rabbinical
court, under certain conditions, it may issue her husband a "permit" to remarry
in the face of his wife's opposition.2 6 This remedy is not available to women in
the same position. If a man withholds his consent to a divorce, his wife has no
remedy against his recalcitrance; she is not divorced and cannot remarry or
have legitimate children until he agrees to grant her the get.27 This unfair
treatment of women is affirmed by the civil-secular court system. When given
the opportunity to narrow the conditions for granting a permit, the Supreme
Court has instead supported an expansive exercise of this discriminatory
measure.
28
This unequal gender-based consideration of spousal consent has given rise
to the pernicious practice of "get extortion., 29 Men can leverage their veto
power over the get as a bargaining chip to demand property concessions, evade
financial obligations, and gain child custody rights.3° In one case, a husband
who left his Holocaust-survivor wife for another woman refused to give her a
get unless she turned over money she received as war reparations. 31 Husbands
can also validly condition their consent upon non-monetary criteria, even
restraining their wives' most basic and private affairs by controlling, for
example, what they can eat or wear.32 A recent survey revealed that close to
100,000 divorced women in Israel were at some point victims of get
extortion.33 In the most egregious cases, no extorted concession can possibly
satisfy husbands withholding a get; one obstinate husband was willing to
25. Glen Frankel, The Rabbinical Ties that Bind, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 19, at 27.
26. Penal Code, 1977, S.H. 226 arts. 176, 179; see also Bleich, supra note 4, at 168-69; Clinton,
supra note 4, at 297-98. The grant of a permit is an unusual remedy requiring the approval of 100 rabbis.
Once a permit is granted, the husband is still formally married to his wife, but substantively has no
financial or other obligations toward her and may marry another wife. See Marc Cwik, The Problem of
Recalcitrance in Jewish Divorce (on file with author).
27. See SHIFMAN, supra note 13, at 420-21.
28. See, e.g., DN 10/69 Boronovsky v. Chief Rabbi [1970] lsrSC 28(1) 7 (holding, in a case where
the rabbinical court granted a remarriage permit to a husband over his wife's objection, that the
rabbinical court enjoys a broad discretion to grant permits and that it may do so in order to compel a
wife to accept the get).
29. Pinchas Shifman, Forty Years to Family Law-A Struggle Between Religious Law and Secular
Law, 19 MiSHPATIM 842, 853 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Honey Rackman, Getting a Get, in WOMEN N CHAINS, supra note 19, at 219.
31. See Lucette Lagnado, Of Human Bondage, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 19, at 3, 6.
32. Case No. 1-21-022290027, in 7 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN
FAMILY MATrERS 6 (2004).
33. Shira Zick, Women Captured By Their Husbands-Israel 2005!, 7 MA'AGALEI TSEDDEK 9, 12
(2006).
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remain in jail for over thirty years, ultimately dying there, rather than divorce
his chained wife.34 As the twentieth century drew to a close, there were sixteen
thousand agunot in Israel waiting in limbo with no way to escape.
35
Disturbingly, the rabbinical court rarely compels men to divorce, thus
empowering, if not encouraging, husbands to withhold the get to extort
concessions from their wives or simply to harass them. Even when men are
commanded to divorce, the court seldom applies the coercive measures that it
was legislatively authorized to use in 1995.36 This is the case even when it is
religiously encouraged or obliged to do so. 3 7 For example, research in 1995
found that while the rabbinical court granted remarriage permits to more than
ninety men in the preceding five years, it had compelled a husband to give his
wife a get through threats of imprisonment only thirty times in forty years.
38
Ironically, a rare instance in which the rabbinical court did induce a husband to
divorce with massive pre-divorce spousal support was invalidated as ultra vires
by the Supreme Court. 39 The Court is often considered extra-vigilant in the
defense of human rights in other contexts, 40 but here precluded the use of this
valuable tool to overcome the vengeance of recalcitrant husbands.
Conversely, when the civil family court ordered a husband to pay his wife
monetary compensation for withholding the get for over twelve years, the
rabbinical court frustrated the effort to achieve justice.41 The court simply
34. CA 220/67 Attorney General v. Ichye Avraham [1967] IsrSC 22(1) 29; see also Capell, supra
note 4, at 342.
35. Francine Klagsbrun, The Struggle of the Agunot, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 19, at 231.
See also the egregious case described in Netty C. Gross, A Horror Story-Ours, in WOMEN IN CHAINS,
supra note 19, at 39.
36. See Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of Divorce Decrees) Law, 1995, S.H. 139 arts. 1-3. This
progressive piece of legislation is discussed infra Part III.B.2. For arguments that the implementation of
the law has been deficient, see Moshe Drori, Enforcement of Divorce in Israel at the End of the
Twentieth Century, http://www.sanhedrin.co.il/documents/droril.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2008). The
rabbinical court also disregards historically-used tools available under Jewish law to alleviate the plight
of agunot. See, e.g., Haut, supra note 19, at 50-53; Shlomo Riskin, A Modern Orthodox Perspective, in
WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 19, at 187, 191. See generally Moshe Meiselman, Jewish Woman in
Jewish Law: Solutions to Problems of Agunah, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 19, at 61. Instead,
Orthodox rabbis have questioned the seriousness of the agunot's situation; some have even held that it is
"the will of the creator" that a woman remain married. Clinton, supra note 4, at 301-02.
37. For instance, when the wife has committed adultery, it is a commandment and a mitzvah to
sever the marriage. See SHIFMAN, supra note 13, at 418; Verhaphtig, supra note 23, at 205-10.
38. Frankel, supra note 25, at 28.
39. HCJ 54/55 Rozentzweig v. Head of the Execution Dep't [1955] IsrSC 9 1541, 1543-50. This
ruling was reaffirmed by subsequent decisions. See, e.g., HCJ 664/82 Salomon v. Salomon [1983] IsrSC
38(4) 365.
40. See, e.g., HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [1998] IsrSC 54(4) 817
(outlawing the use of physical measures against terrorists in General Security Service interrogations).
See also the cases described in Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned
Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 593-94 (1996).
41. See Case No. 19270/03 C.S. v. C.P. [2004] (not yet reported), available at
http://www.nevo.co.ilVPsika-word/mishpaha/sm03019270.doc. For an overview of the use thus far of
tort law by agunot, and the various implications this usage has for the structure of family law, see Yifat
Bitton, Public Hierarchy-Private Harm: Negotiating Divorce Within Judaism, in
[Vol. 20:441
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refuses to process a divorce application unless the civil court keeps its hands
42off the divorce proceedings and until any civil order is revoked. Even when a
husband voluntarily agrees to both a get and compensation for his wife, the
rabbinical court may refuse to process the divorce, forcing the wife to choose
either a monetary civil order or a religious divorce order. 43 The counter-actions
of the rival court systems can thus sadly cancel out each other's effectiveness to
the detriment of women. It is no wonder, then, that Israeli family law is referred
to as "war law," and women are cast in the role of captive victims.
44
Women face a further double standard from the rabbinical court with
regard to get extortion. When husbands withhold the get, the court actively
encourages wives to submit to their demands, regardless of how excessive they
may be, even if the interests of both women and children are clearly
jeopardized.4 5 If wives refuse to do so, the court has been known to chastise
them or even rescind the divorce order until they agree to succumb to their
husbands' whims.46 The Supreme Court in turn has remained indifferent to the
plight of women coerced into making excessive concessions for freedom. Its
opinions have viewed the distress of the agunot as irrelevant and even as a
legitimate exchange for marital liberty4 7-in effect finding the get to be
equivalent to legal tender and commodifying the divorce decree. 48 On the other
hand, in an instance when the rabbinical court suspected that a woman was
attempting to use get extortion for economic reasons, it did not encourage her
husband to submit to her demands. Rather, it condemned the wife, finding it
"inconceivable" to "chain" a husband for financial gain.
49
Worse still, the rabbinical court has recently resurrected an obscure
minority doctrine, allowing for the retroactive invalidation of a get if an ex-
(RE)INTERPRETATIONS: THE SHAPES OF JUSTICE IN WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE (Laurel S. Peterson & Lisa
Dresdner eds., 2008).
42. Auriel Lavie, Ordering Divorce After Ordering a Husband to Compensate His Wife, 26
TCHUMIN 160 (2006) (exploring the positions of the rabbis toward intervention by civil courts into the
divorce arena); Lovitch, supra note 23 (same).
43. Lavie, supra note 42, at 170-71.
44. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Towards Concluding Civil Family Law-Israel Style, 17 MEHKAREI
MISHPAT 105, 108 (2001).
45. This is the case when husbands make financial demands that may lead women to destitution, or
when such demands include low child support or forgoing custody. Zick, supra note 33, at 10; see, e.g.,
Case of the Rabbinical Court (TA), in 82 DIVREI MISHPAT 153; Case No. 11664295-21-2 [2005], in 12
HADIN VE'HADAYAN 5 (2006).
46. Zick, supra note 33, at 9-10, 12. For examples, see cases cited supra note 45.
47. See, e.g., CA 5490/92 Fagas v. Fagas [1994] Tak-E1 94(4) 516; CA 162/72 Amzaleg v.
Amzaleg [1973] lsrSC 27(1) 582, 587-88.
48. 2 DANIEL FRIEDMAN & NILI COHEN, CONTRACTS 990 (1993) (describing the status of the get as
a commodity); Shifian, supra note 29, at 853-54 (noting that civil courts have approved of unfair child
support agreements that wives entered into in exchange for divorce).
49. Case No. 8885, in 13 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN FAMILY
MATTERS 5-6 (2006) (suggesting that the wife's request for reconciliation stemmed from her desire to
keep living in the marital home and ordering her to accept the divorce).
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wife fails to fulfill the conditions upon which she was divorced.5° The
consequences of this doctrine are far-reaching and may even subject women to
a perpetual bar from remarriage. If such women remarried based on the get,
their subsequent marriages could be declared invalid and the children of the
second marriage illegitimate.51 Indeed, in several cases the rabbinical court,
sometimes on its own initiative, has doubted the validity of the get of a
divorced woman who has had children with another man.52 The Supreme
Court, in turn, has not stopped this abuse, giving an implicit stamp of approval
to a gross violation of women's rights.53 Thus, an Israeli Jewish woman today
can never be sure that her divorce is final and that she is free of her ex-
husband's control.
C. Unequal Secular Alternatives When Religious Divorce Is Unavailable
Absent a religious divorce, a woman must remain in her moribund
marriage. Were she to date others, her relationships would be deemed
adulterous, causing serious consequences for her financial rights and barring
her from ever marrying her lover.54 The rabbinical court could deprive her of
child custody, diminish her prospective alimony and property rights, or even
issue restraining orders preventing her from allowing other men into her
home. 55 Were she to have children with another man, they and their
descendants would be deemed bastards, excluded from the Jewish community
56and denied certain rights and privileges. None of these consequences apply to
a man. He may cohabitate with another unmarried woman while retaining his
50. See, e.g., Case No. 1-23-9997 (TA), in 14 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT
DECISIONS IN FAMILY MATTERS 8 (2007). For the origins and status of the doctrine, see Shifman, supra
note 19, at 40-41.
51. For the disastrous consequences that flow from an invalid get, see infra Part I.C.
52. For a discussion of such cases, see Amihai Radzyner, From Lviv to Tel-Aviv: "Wrongful
Divorce" Judgments in the Israeli Rabbinical Courts (forthcoming) (on file with author) (providing a
comprehensive account of the retroactive invalidation doctrine and its application in the rabbinical
courts). For a compilation of rabbinical court decisions discussing and applying the retroactive
invalidation doctrine, see 13 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN FAMILY
MATTERS (2006).
53. HCJ 5548/00 Cohen v. Grand Rabbinical Court [2001] (not yet reported) (approving the
invalidation of the divorce when the ex-wife refused to forgo all the financial rights the civil family
court granted her).
54. Case No. 1-22-051778991 [2005] (not yet reported); see also HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note
2, at 236; Halperin, supra note 15, at 297.
55. Frankel, supra note 25, at 28.
56. It must be stressed that such consequences are legal, not just religious. Adultery is not only a
grave sin from a religious perspective, but also carries practical civil results that impact non-religious
women, including those discussed supra. Thus, even non-religious women would be reluctant to
conceive a child with another partner while legally married, since that child would be highly stigmatized
and by law unable to marry another Jew. See HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 236; Capell, supra
note 4, at 337; Chigier, supra note 5, at 207-08; Clinton, supra note 4, at 296.
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economic rights, and children born of such a relationship would not be
considered social and legal outcasts.
57
Despite the already advantageous position of men, civil and rabbinical
court doctrines further aid the position of husbands at the expense of their
wives. For example, the civil courts often condition property distribution on
divorce, thus depriving wives who are unable to get the get of their share of
joint property. 58 Further, civil courts have treated the girlfriends of formally-
married men as new wives, according them the rights and privileges that belong
to the aguna.59 Thus, even a man who wants a get can play hard to get, since he
is legally able, if not encouraged, to live with other women without a divorce,
while his wife is chained to a marriage which exists only in name. The wife in
turn may have no choice but to pay for the divorce that her husband desires.
Unsurprisingly, as a result, Israel presents an extreme example of the
feminization of divorce-over ninety percent of all divorce petitions are
initiated by women.
60
In sum, the Israeli dissolution regime is rife with prejudice and abuse and
creates substantial incentives for men to oppose divorce. Both the religious and
secular Israeli courts have unaccountably allowed, aided, and even incited
husbands to prevent their wives from obtaining divorces-leaving women
indefinitely enchained in their marriages as agunot. Trapped between a rock
and a hard place, these women are thus torn between commitment to the
principles of their faith and the desire to rehabilitate their lives and form a new
family. Paradoxically, the more a woman values the religious system, the
higher the price she pays for its divorce rules. It is little wonder that inequality
in the divorce domain is considered the most severe discrimination faced by
Israeli women today.
61
57. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 236; Capell, supra note 4, at 337; Chigier, supra note 5,
at 207-08; Clinton, supra note 4, at 296.
58. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 238; Shifman, supra note 29, at 853.
59. See, e.g., CA 384/61 Israel v. Pasler [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 102 (developing this policy). The "new
wives" have even been entitled to change their last names to those of their "husbands" in the face of the
legal wives' opposition. CA 6086/94 Ela Nizri v. Office of the Population Registration [1996] IsrSC
49(5) 693; see also Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will: On the Non-Liberal Facet of
Cohabitation Law, 25 IYUNEI MISHPAT (2001) (noting the radical nature of Israeli cohabitation law in
treating cohabiting couples for almost all intents and purposes as if they were married).
60. Gill Ronen, The New Agunot, YEDIOT ACHRONOT, OCT. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.ynet.co.it/articles/0,7340,L-3310736,00.html. In the western world, women also initiate
divorce more than men, but at a lower proportion. In the United States, for example, "two-thirds of all
divorces are initiated by women." Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated
Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 609, 619 (2006).
61. Jack Nusan Porter, Introduction: The Agunah-A Personal Perspective, in WOMEN IN CHAINS,
supra note 19, at xi, xiv (citing a letter from the Israel Women's Network).
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D. Progress in the New Millennium? Proposals Calling for Divorce Reform
Male use of get extortion has made the get process one of the most
disgraceful and painful aspects of Israeli law and contemporary Jewish life. The
manifest harms caused by the inequality of the current divorce system have
finally led policymakers to consider reform of existing law, including the
potential adoption of an alternative civil divorce system. Since religious law
has always governed divorce in Israel, the question of an appropriate civil
policy of divorce law is in its infancy, and only preliminary progress has been
made in exploring the substance of desirable secular divorce rules.
62
Nonetheless, three major proposals have been made, which alter the existing
scheme to varying degrees: the Gavison-Medan Covenant, the Israel
Democracy Institute (IDI) model, and the Ministry of Justice model.63
The Gavison-Medan Covenant, the proposal that is most restrictive of the
divorce right, envisions a civil marriage structure but continues to commit
divorce to a religious, fault-based regime. 64 The Covenant does allow for
unrestricted and unconditional civil dissolution of marriage, but that dissolution
alone is insufficient to permit remarriage.
65
In the middle of the pack, the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) model
creates an alternative to the existing civil marriage structure, known as a
"spousal covenant." In this model, couples seeking to create a binding and
recognized spousal relationship outside the framework of religious marriage
will be registered with the state as having established a spousal covenant. Such
registration vests the couple with all the civil rights enjoyed by couples in the
civil marriage system. Couples are able to dissolve a covenant without
62. SHAHAR LIFSHITZ, THE SPOUSAL REGISTRY: ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF DEMOCRACY 31-33 (2007).
63. For a survey of recent proposals to transform Israeli divorce law, see Shahar Lifshitz, Spousal
Registry, in SEFER SHAVA 361 (Aharon Barak & Daniel Friedman eds., 2006). Additionally, in July
2008, thirty-four Knesset members introduced a private bill that would establish an additional civil track
for marriage and divorce. See Bill for the Establishment of the Status of Couples to a Spousal
Agreement, 2008, available at http://www.nevo.co.il/Lawword/law04/2008-3847.doc. Though the bill
pledges allegiance to a no-fault version of divorce, it is significantly stricter than the other two no-fault
models (discussed infra Parts III.C.2, III.C.3), requiring mediation, one-year delays, and significant
court involvement in assessing the status of dissolving marriages. Since even the more lenient and
liberal no-fault models are not free from constitutional doubts (see infra Parts III.C.2, III.C.3), this new
bill is afortiori constitutionally problematic.
64. RUTH GAVISON & YAACOV MEDAN, FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL TREATY BETWEEN
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PEOPLE IN ISRAEL 31-39 (2003). For a shorter English version of the main
points and principles of the Covenant, see YOAv ARTSIELI, THE GAVISION-MEDAN COVENANT: MAIN
POINTS AND PRINCIPLES (2004), available at http://www.gavison-medan.org.ilVFileServer/
792c573c471c12fd8eac98ae9e2Icc89.pdf. The Covenant allows marriage and dissolution proceedings
in both civil and rabbinical courts but only considers people single if they would have that status under
religious law. GAVISON & MEDAN, supra, at 42, 48-49. It is perhaps telling that the authors of the
Covenant clearly state in the preface of their proposal that the court "will not be granted the authority to
invalidate laws concerning the covenant." Id. at 14.
65. While the Covenant does not include prerequisites for civil dissolution, it does permit the civil
court to condition its grant upon the prior conclusion of the marriage according to religious law.
GAVISON & MEDAN, supra note 64, at 42.
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establishing fault, but only under certain procedural restrictions.66 The model
distinguishes between consensual divorce, which requires a six-month waiting
period, and disputed divorce, which requires at least a one-year waiting period.
After one year, impossibility of reconciliation must be established; if it is not,
the divorce-seeker must wait an additional year, although the court may shorten
or prolong the divorce proceedings as it sees fit.
67
At the other extreme, the Ministry of Justice model also creates a spousal
covenant, from which a less restrictive, no-fault version of dissolution is
available, provided that a couple was not married pursuant to religious law.
68
This model champions a hands-off approach to uncontested divorce 69 and
imposes a waiting period of six months for unilateral divorce, during which the
couple must undergo mediation in an attempt to resolve their disputes. 70 The
court is further authorized to withhold dissolution orders until procedures
relating to property distribution and child custody are concluded.71
These new models for divorce all provide increased protection for women
whose rights have been ignored under current law. However, to be adopted,
proposals must do more than improve existing law; they must be consistent
with the rights and duties existing under the new Israeli Constitution. The next
two Parts will explore the content and scope of the unique Israeli Constitution,
and its implications for both current divorce law and divorce reform proposals.
II. THE RISE OF THE ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE
In contrast to the stagnant divorce regime, Israeli constitutional law has
come through a period of enormous transition. This section will investigate the
unique Israeli constitutional regime of Basic Laws and its mandates in search of
66. See Draft Bill of the Spousal Covenant of the Israel Democracy Institute, in LIFSHITZ, supra
note 62, at 87-94. The proposal does not alter the existing civil marriage structure, which only
recognizes as "marriage" those unions created and dissolved according to Orthodox religious law, but
creates the spousal covenant as an alternative to civil marriage. Id. at iv.
67. Id. at 91-92 (art. 9).
68. Bill Determining the Status of Couples Entering into a Spousal Covenant 2004, in LIFSHITZ,
supra note 62, at 97-105. As in the previous proposal, spousal covenants accord couples the same rights
and duties to which married couples are subject, except for rights or duties originating in religious law.
Id. at 100-01 (art. 7).
69. Id. at 101 (art. 8(a)(2)). The bill does not use the term "divorce," but rather "dissolution."
Alongside dissolution, which is executed by courts, the bill establishes a procedure called "deletion from
the registry," executed by the registrar, for couples who mutually seek divorce or for widows and
widowers. Id. at 101 (art. 8(a)). The bill apparently gives unbridled discretion to the registrar to refuse
the application, although couples can appeal the registrar's decisions. The bill does not specify the
grounds or parameters upon which the registrar may decline an application for deletion. Id. at 102 (art.
8(e)).
70. Id. at 103 (art. 9(b)). The court can also dissolve spousal covenants under various
circumstances: (1) if registration was fraudulent; (2) if, one year after a party applies for dispute
resolution, his partner's whereabouts are unknown; (3) if one party has a mental or emotional defect; or
(4) if one party marries another person in Israel or abroad. Id. at 102 (art. 9(a)).
71. Id. at 103 (art. 9(b)).
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a key to unlock Israeli women's marital chains. It discusses the Constitution's
birth, content, scope, and principal postulates, as well as the degree of judicial
scrutiny of legislation required by these principles.
A. The Birth of the Constitution: A Judge-Created Constitutional Revolution
In 1992, two laws relating to human rights were passed: Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Their
enactment marked a watershed in the Israeli legal world, sparking a
"constitutional revolution." 73  These laws were ostensibly just ordinary
legislation to which the label "Basic Law" was appended. They were adopted
through regular legislative processes, with low attendance and a slim majority,
in what some have called a "guerilla" fashion.74 Since they include neither
entrenchment nor supremacy clauses, they may be amended or repealed in any
quorum by a regular majority and have no supra-legislative status.
75
Furthermore, by 1992 the Knesset had already enacted eight Basic Laws
without the Supreme Court finding that a constitution was in the making.76
However, in 1995, the Supreme Court took the entire legal community-
and the Knesset itself-by surprise with its revolutionary decision holding the
Basic Laws to be a Constitution. 77 The Court, while sitting as a Court of Civil
72. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,
1992, S.H. 114 (amended 1994, S.H. 90).
73. lzhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1903 (2000) (quoting Israeli Supreme Court President Aharon Barak). For a
discussion of Israeli legal history prior to 1992, see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written
Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309, 312-
22 (1995).
74. Thirty-two Knesset members were in favor, twenty-one were against, and one member
abstained in voting on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The other sixty-six members of the
Knesset did not attend what was later held to be a vote adopting a constitution. Only twenty-three
Members of the Knesset (MKs) participated in the vote for Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, though
they unanimously supported the bill. See Yoav Dotan, Constitution for Israel?-The Constitutional
Dialogue After the "Constitutional Revolution," 28 MISHPATIM 149, 181-82 (1997); Dotan, supra note
2, at 303 n.37.
75. Pre-1995 Israeli case law actually took the absence of a supremacy clause as indicating the
regular status of some Basic Laws. See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for
Reevaluation and Constitutional Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 617, 644 (1999).
The importance of such provisions can be seen, for example, in the U.S. and Canadian cases. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. I I (U.K.) art.
52, § i.
76. These eight statutes were enacted as Basic Law: The Parliament; Basic Law: Israel Lands;
Basic Law: The President of the State; Basic Law: The Government; Basic Law: The State Economy;
Basic Law: The Army; Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel; and Basic Law: The Judiciary. None of
these Basic Laws were held to have constitutional or supreme status. See, e.g., HCJ 60/77 Ressler v.
Chairman of the Knesset Central Election Comm. [1977] lsrSC 31(2) 556; HCJ 119/80 HaCohen v.
Government of Israel [ 1980] IsrSC 34(4) 281.
77. A. Benjamin Archibald, We Live To Survive Our Paradoxes: In Defense of Israel as a Jewish
and Democratic State, 10 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 32, 35 (2004).
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Appeals in an ordinary case, endowed the Israeli people with a formal
constitution by means of case law. As Chief Justice Barak held:
We have now joined the community of democratic countries (among
them the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy and South Africa)
with constitutional bills of rights .... [T]he constitutional revolution is
seen in the changed constitutional status of human rights. They have
become constitutional rights, engraved upon the pages of the
constitution and enjoying normative supremacy.... Each of the Basic
Laws constitutes a chapter in the constitution of the State of Israel.
Each chapter stands at the head of the normative pyramid.78
The Supreme Court further found for itself the power of judicial review,
79
despite the Basic Laws' silence on the issue and the legislature's explicit
statements that the Basic Laws were not intended to grant courts this power.
80
Today, it is an established fact that the enactment of the Basic Laws
brought about a constitutional revolution in Israel and that the legislature must
now answer to the Court. 81 However, the scope and boundaries of the new
constitutional regime are still far from clear-and they are continuing to
expand.
B. The Content and Application of the Constitution: Scope and Boundaries
The rights explicitly enumerated in the Basic Laws include the rights to
life, body, and dignity, the right to property, liberty of the individual, the right
to exit and enter the country, the right to privacy and personal confidentiality,
and freedom of occupation. 82 This limited bill of rights, however, does not
encompass basic constitutional guarantees such as equal treatment and freedom
of religion. While it is customary to state that equal protection of the law is a
foundation for any democratic state and that it is "so simple, self-evident, and
rational that it has been recognized without exception in all constitutions," 83 the
Israeli case confounds this conventional wisdom.
78. CA 6821/93 Unified Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Collective Viii. (1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 341.
79. Id. at 314-16.
80. See DK (1992) 3783; see also Sapir, supra note 75, at 656.
81. Segev, supra note 7, at 463-64. Note that even before the Basic Laws created a formal Bill of
Rights, civil rights were protected by the Court, starting with Justice Agranat's landmark decision on
freedom of expression in HCJ 87/53 Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871. See
also David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli
Constitutional Law?, 26 ISR. L. REv. 238, 239 (1992); Zaharah R. Markoe, Expressing Oneself Without
a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319 (2000).
82. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 arts. 2-7; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992, S.H. 114 art. 3 (amended 1994, S.H. 90).
83. Awad Mohammed El Morr, Human Rights in the Constitutional Systems of Egypt and Other
Islamic Countries: International and Comparative Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 162, 185-86 (Kevin Boyle & Adel
Omar Sheriff eds., 1996) (emphasis added).
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The omission was no legislative accident. For the fiercely contested 1992
Basic Laws to pass, it was necessary to bargain for the consent of unsupportive
religious parties.8 4 Fearful that the Supreme Court would use Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty to invalidate discriminatory religious law,
particularly divorce law, the religious parties were only willing to give their
consent in exchange for the exclusion of equality and freedom of religion from
the Basic Law.85 Thus, Israeli divorce law was responsible for key features of
constitutional law; those constitutional features have in turn fed back into
divorce law, and caused concomitant harm to Israeli women.
Divorce considerations are also responsible for the limited application of
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Motivated again by fear that the
Supreme Court "would construe the freedoms that are specified in the bill so
broadly in a way we can not even dream of,"'86 the religious parties insisted on a
savings clause that immunized legislation already in force against application
of the Basic Law, thereby protecting family law from judicial review.
8 7
Thus, women's marital emancipation was sacrificed on the altar of political
compromise. Israel's wives were chained not only by their husbands, but
further by the legislature's complicity in throwing away the constitutional key
to their liberty. Worse, while it was included mainly for the sake of divorce, the
precedent-setting Savings Clause has far broader consequences, providing a
constitutional umbrella for all prior legislation which violates the Basic Law's
constitutional mandates. 8 So not only did politicians throw away a potential
tool for emancipating women from the antiquated divorce regime, they also
undermined the decisive role the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty could
have played in the entire legal system.
The Constitution's limited application and content notwithstanding, Israeli
jurisprudence has long acknowledged that fundamental rights may exist outside
of the constitutional text and that these unenumerated rights are entitled to the
same supra-legislative normative status as explicit constitutional guarantees.
8 9
In deriving such rights, the Israeli Supreme Court draws its inspiration from a
broad and generous reading of the terms "human dignity" and "liberty" that
84. See DK (1992) 3782-3783.
85. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 920-921 (2005); Barak-Erez, supra note 73, at 325; Sapir, supra note 75, at 638; Strong, supra
note 2, at 150.
86. DK(1992) 3786.
87. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 10 (amended 1994, S.H. 90);
see also Dalia Domer, Does Israel Have a Constitution?, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1325, 1328 (1999).
88. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391 (amended 1994, S.H. 1454). For
example, Israel's voluminous security legislation, primarily the Defense (Emergency] Regulations of
1945, which gives military commanders immense power over individuals, is protected from review. See
Shimon Shetreet, Emergency Legislation in Israel in Light of the Basic Law: Legislation Proposal, I
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 433 (1993).
89. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution-Protected Fundamental Rights, I MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 9 (1992); Aharon Barak, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 41 HAPRAKLIT 271
(1994).
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occur throughout the Basic Law.90 However, the theoretical backing for this
reading is currently obscure and under-developed and fails to provide even the
most minimal guidelines for its application. 91 In fact, the Court explicitly
rejects such guidelines or any other constraints on its constitutional analysis
and decisions. 92 Because the Court, rather than relying on text, history,
structure, or other such criteria, simply draws on the vague and potentially all-
inclusive concepts of "human dignity" and the "liberty and freedom of the
individual" as vehicles for the discovery and incorporation of new fundamental
rights,93 almost any right may be accorded constitutional status.
94
Indeed, after the Constitution was established, the Court enthusiastically
embarked on an open-ended, unconstrained quest to discover new rights and
90. See, e.g., HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Commander of Jerusalem Dist. [1993] IsrSC 48 (2) 456, 470;
3 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 423-26 (1994);
HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 25. For the origin and legal and historical meanings of the term
"human dignity," see Englard, supra note 73.
91. For a critical analysis of the liberal judicial construction of the term "dignity," see David
Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value-Part 1, 1999 PUB. L. 682, 697-98.
92. Sapir, supra note 75, at 658-59. This attitude is in marked contrast to U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, which makes at least a rhetorical effort to acknowledge constraints on the derivation of
unenumerated substantive rights and to exercise restraint in reaching constitutional questions. See, e.g.,
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (finding substantive due process rights to exist only where
such rights are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed"); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should not reach constitutional questions if the case can be
decided on a non-constitutional ground); see also Marcia Gelpe, Constraints on Supreme Court
Authority in Israel and the United States: Phenomenal Cosmic Powers; Itty Bitty Living Space, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 493, 530-59 (1999) (concluding that the Israeli Supreme Court has far more
latitude in its constitutional decisionmaking than its American counterpart).
93. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 arts. 1, 2, 4, 5. Chief Justice Barak
elaborated,
[T]he right to human dignity is, by nature, a "framework" or "general" right. The nature of
such a right is that, according to its wording, it does not give explicit details of the particular
types of activity to which it applies. It is open-ended. The situations to which it applies are
derived from the interpretation of the open language of the Basic Law against the background
of its purpose.
HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [2006] (not yet
reported) (opinion of Barak, C.J., 31) (citations omitted). For a review of the implementation of this
technique in the case law, see Hillel Somer, The Unenumerated Rights-On the Scope of the
Constitutional Revolution, 28 MISHPATIM 257 (1997). See also Aharon Barak, Protected Human Rights:
Scope and Limitations, 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 253 (1993); Barak, Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Right, supra note 89; Sapir, supra note 75, at 645-46.
94. Indeed, as Justice Zamir commented,
In case-law since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, various obiter
dicta can be found that see many aspects in the Basic Law. This is particularly so with regard
to the right to dignity. The same is true of legal literature. Some see in human dignity the
principle of equality, some see in it the freedom of speech, and some see in it other basic
rights that are not mentioned in the Basic Law. Someone compiling these statements could
receive the impression that human dignity is, seemingly, the whole law in a nutshell, and that
it is possible to apply to it the saying of the rabbis: "Study it from every aspect, for
everything is in it."
HCJ 453/94 Israel Women's Network v. Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 501, 536; see also Domer, supra note
87, at 1330 (questioning this prevalent approach); Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the
Form and Legitimacy of Constitutional Adjudication in Israel: A Blueprint for Redefining the Role of the
Supreme Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL. L. REV. 659, 733-34 (2003).
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complete the fledgling constitutional enterprise. 95 Faithful to its standing as
perhaps the most activist court in the world,96 the Israeli Supreme Court
recognized a veritable catalog of fundamental guarantees, including freedoms
of speech, association, movement, and science,9 7 the right to be heard,9 8 marital
and parental rights, 99 the right to due process of law,100 the right to wear a beard
regardless of religious belief,' 0' and even the right to obtain basic social
services essential to a respectable human existence.
10 2
Moreover, even though the legislature firmly intended to exclude them
both, the Court has interpreted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty to
encompass the right to equality as well as freedom of religion, rendering them
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights.'0 3 Thus, the Court's creatively-
exercised interpretive power slickly ushered these guarantees through the
window even after the legislature unequivocally threw them out the door.'
0 4
This activist and expansionist interpretive trend has such momentum that it led
95. See Gelpe, supra note 92, at 551-56; Yehudit Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty-A
Biography of Power Struggles, I MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323 (1993); Sapir, supra note 75, at 658-59;
Shetreet, supra note 94, at 723 (criticizing the "sweeping formulations" of the Court and its suggestion
that "everything is justiciable"). The Court did, however, decline to derive environmental rights from
"human dignity" since this would elevate "the entire array of political, civil, social, and economic
human rights to a constitutional status." HCJ 4128/02 Israeli Envtl. Ass'n v. Prime Minister [2002]
IsrSC 58(3) 503, 518-19. The Israeli approach is in contrast to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
considers certain issues inappropriate for judicial decision, see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
and is relatively reserved in its careful recognition of new unenumerated fundamental rights, see, e.g.,
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S 214, 225-26 (1985).
96. Dotan, supra note 2, at 331-34; Shetreet, supra note 94, at 697.
97. See, e.g., 3 BARAK, supra note 90, at 416-33; Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Interpretation, 3
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 335 (1995).
98. See references to cases and legal literature in Bracha, supra note 8, at 627.
99. See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of
Interior [2006] (not yet reported).
100. For the constitutional status of due process under Israeli law, see the decision of Judge
Menachem Klein in CA [TA] 156232/05 Hertzeliya Municipality v. Hadara Sales Vardiman [2005],
available at http://www.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titles.asp?build= 2&System 1 &Exec=&cpq=l.
101. HCJ 205/94Nofv. Israel [1997] IsrSC 50(5)449.
102. See, e.g., HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace & Soc. Justice Ass'n v. Ministry of Treasury (not
yet reported), available at http://webl.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titles.asp?build=2&System=l&
Exec=&cpq=l (requiring the state to provide food, home, health services, and reasonable sanitary
conditions).
103. Even before the enactment of the Basic Laws, equality principles were enshrined in Israeli
common law, but a statute was capable of violating that right. "The right to equality constitutes an
integral part of Israeli law .... Since the establishment of the State, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that equality is the 'soul of the whole of our constitutional system .... ' HCJ 7052/03 Adalah
Legal Ctr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 1 29) (surveying decisions establishing the importance of the right to
equality prior to the constitutional revolution); see CA 721/94 El Al v. Danilovitz [1996] lsrSC 48(5)
749; CA 524/88 Pri HaEmek Agric. Coop. Soc'y Ltd. v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd. [1991]
IsrSC 45(4) 529, 561. By later deriving the right to equality from Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, the Israeli Supreme Court accorded the previously recognized right new supra-legislative status.
See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 39); CA 5394/92 Hoppert v. Yad
VaShem [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353, 362. For the constitutional status of the right to religion, see Sapir,
supra note 3, at 190-91.
104. Moshe Landau, Granting Constitution to Israel by Means of Case Law, 3 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 697, 701 (1996).
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religious political figures to state that they would oppose even the enactment of
the Ten Commandments as Basic Law for fear of the Court's "unbridled"
judicial creativity.
105
C. The Benchmarks of Israeli Constitutional Review
The Israeli legal system, like other constitutional democracies, recognizes
that individual rights must be balanced against other state interests, and so
allows them to be infringed upon, subject to well-defined constitutional
parameters.10 6 The Basic Laws allow the encroachment of otherwise-applicable
fundamental rights under their Limitation Clause, which provides that "[t]here
shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting
the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent
no greater than is required."
' 107
This clause thus creates a four-part test that legislation must pass as a
prerequisite to its constitutionality:
1. Impairment of constitutionally protected rights can only be by law
or in accordance with law, rather than by administrative order or
regulation.108
2. The impairing law must be consistent with the values of the State of
Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state,' ° 9 though attempts to
formulate a synthesis between these seemingly incompatible objectives
105. Segev, supra note 7, at 467.
106. Domer, supra note 87, at 1331; see also HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't in Israel v.
Knesset [2005] (not yet reported) (opinion of Barak, C.J., 45) (noting that the Limitation Clause is "the
foothold on which the constitutional balance between society as a whole and the individual is based").
Other countries and institutions have similar systems. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 36; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 29, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Canada, for example, has a Notwithstanding Clause. Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. II (U.K.) art. 33. Section 33(1) of the Charter of
Rights, permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to adopt legislation to override section 2 of the
Charter (containing such fundamental rights as freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom
of association and freedom of assembly) and sections 7-15 of the Charter (containing the right to life,
liberty and security of the person, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom from
arbitrary arrest or detention, a number of other legal rights, and the right to equality). Such a use of the
notwithstanding power must be contained in an act, not subordinate legislation (regulations), and must
be express rather than implied. For a thorough discussion of the origin and application of the
Notwithstanding Clause, see DAVID JOHANSEN & PHILIP ROSEN, LAW & GOV'T DIv., PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH BRANCH, THE NOTWITHSTANDING CLAUSE OF THE CHARTER (2005), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp 194-e.htm.
107. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 8; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992, S.H. 90 art. 4; see also LCA 3145/99 Bank Leumi of Israel Ltd. v. Hazan [20031
IsrSC 57(5) 385, 405 (holding that the Limitation Clause is intended to delineate the boundaries within
which primary legislation of the Knesset can be enacted even where it contains a violation of human
rights, provided that this violation is found in the proper sphere of the balances between the protection of
the right and the need to achieve other important purposes that are involved in violating it).
108. See HCJ 3267/97 Rubinshtein v. Minister of Sec. [2000] IsrSC 52(5) 481, 521-24.
109. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 arts. IA, 8; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992, S.H. 90.
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have provoked bitter controversy. 110 The prevalent judicial model
suggests that potential conflicts should be avoided by applying the
most abstract and universalistic interpretation possible of Jewish
principles.' i
3. The impairing law must have a "proper" purpose. A purpose may
be regarded as proper if it is intended to realize general social goals,
such as welfare policies or protection of the public interest, which are
consistent with the values of the state as a whole and which display
sensitivity to the place of human rights in the overall social system.
112
The evaluation of whether a purpose is proper is not limited to
considering the historic purpose that motivated the legislature, but may
also include possible purposes apparent to the Court at the time of its
opinion. 113 The degree to which the purpose needs to be realized for it
to be "proper" varies in accordance with the nature of the right that is
violated and the extent of the violation thereof. Thus, the more
important the right, and the more serious the violation of the right, the
stronger must be the public interest in order to justify the violation. 1
4
4. Finally, the law may only impair rights to the extent necessary. This
test of proportionality is comprised of three sub-tests inspired by
Canadian and European law. 115 Under the "rational relationship" sub-
110. See, e.g., Abraham Sagie, Judaism and Democracy-A Conflict?, 2 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
169 (2000). One group of scholars gives precedence to the term "Jewish" and argues that it refers
specifically to religious law. See Menachem Elon, The Way of Law in the Constitution: The Values of
the Jewish and Democratic State in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, 17 MISHPATIM
659 (1993). Another group emphasizes the term "democratic" and argues in favor of a secular
interpretation of Judaism: a nationalism historically related to religion but normatively independent of it.
See 3 BARAK, supra note 90, at 328-47.
Ill. 3 BARAK, supra note 90, at 328-47; Dorner, supra note 87, at 1333-35.
112. See HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't in Israel v. Knesset [2006] (not yet reported)
(opinion of Barak, C.J., 51-52); HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister ofTransp. [2000] IsrSC 51(4)1,42.
113. CA 6821/93 Unified Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Collective Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 343.
114. HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transp. [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235, 258; HCJ 6055/95
Tzemah v. Minister of Def. [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241, 273. This constitutional examination, however, is
still underdeveloped in Israeli law and it is not yet clear how to determine when a purpose is sufficiently
important to qualify as valid under the Limitation Clause. To date, the Court has recognized only that
when a statute violates a central right, such as human dignity, the purpose of the law will justify the
violation if the purpose seeks to realize a "major social goal," or an "urgent social need," but "[i]t is
possible that violations of less central rights will justify a lower level of need." HCJ 7052/03 Adalah
Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [2006] (not yet reported) (opinion of
Barak, C.J., 63); HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't in Israel (opinion of Barak, C.J., 53);
HCJ 5016/96 Horev, at 42. It seems, thus, that the Israeli Court rejected the exemplary Canadian model
which adopts a unified test, whereby the law's purpose is deemed proper if directed to social needs of
fundamental importance, regardless of which particular right is being affected. See R. v. Oakes, [1986]
S.C.R. 103, 138 (Can.). The Israeli system is thus more akin to the problematic American-style use of
tiers of scrutiny; under this complex and judicially manipulable system, the government must meet
different standards in justifying legislation, depending on the nature of the right at issue. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 161 (1984).
115. Proportionality is the central test in Canada. See Oakes, I S.C.R., at 138; PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 875 (3d ed. 1992). This is also the case in Germany, the European
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test, the legislative means by which a fundamental right is injured must
be rationally tailored to achieve a state interest. Under the "least
restrictive means" test, the state must not be able to achieve its purpose
by other, less restrictive legislative measures. Finally, under the
"proportionate measure test," or "proportionality in the strict sense,"
there must be a proper balance between the public good and the private
harm arising from infringement of a right. It concerns "the benefit
arising from the policy as compared with the damage that it brings in
its wake."' 16 The application of the subtests is influenced by the nature
of the violated right and its status on the scale of human rights, the
degree and scope of the violation thereof, and the importance and
weight of the values and interests that the violating law is intended to
realize.' 17
These unique elements of the Israeli Constitution provide a backdrop
against which I analyze the current state of divorce law and future efforts to
safeguard women's right to marital dissolution. The legislature has not released
itself from obligations to change the current deeply-flawed system, and the
ongoing constitutional revolution must therefore influence the path forward.
III. VIEWING DIVORCE LAW THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL LENS
The evolving Israeli Constitution has the potential to affect and govem the
divorce domain. The following section explores divorce as a new entrant in the
pantheon of fundamental constitutional rights, then moves on to analyze the
implications of a divorce right on the current regime of marital dissolution and
current proposals for its reform.
A. The Right to Marital Freedom: Outlines of its Constitutional Profile
As previously discussed, one of the most salient trends shaping the Israeli
constitutional landscape is the judicial eagerness to interpret generously the key
concepts of "dignity" and "liberty." Most importantly, the Supreme Court has
held that the right to family life-the right to belong to a family unit, to marry
and live together, and to bear and raise children-is constitutionally
Community, and the European Court for Human Rights in Strasburg. See Georg Nolte, General
Principles of German and European Administrative Law-A Comparison in Historical Perspective, 57
MOD. L. REv. 191,192-93 (1994).
116. For leading cases analyzing these tests, see HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel
[2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; HCJ 4128/00 Prime Minister v. Hofman [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 289; HCJ 450/97
Tnufa v. Minister of Labor & Welfare [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 433; HCJ 987/94 Yuronet Golden Lines v.
Minister of Commc'n [1996] IsrSC 48(5) 412.
117. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ct. (opinion of Procaccia, J., 4); HCJ 4769/95 Menahem, at
280; HCJ 1715/97 Israel Inv. Managers Ass'n v. Minister of Fin. [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367, 420-22.
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protected. 118 These rights are "fundamentals of human existence," at the core of
human dignity and autonomy," 9 and it is thus "hard to describe human rights
that are their equal in their importance and strength."'
120
While all the justices acknowledged that the right to family life is
enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,' 21 they based the
existence of the right on different foundations. Most justices viewed family life
as deriving directly from the constitutional right to human dignity. They
explained,
The right to human dignity constitutes a collection of rights which
must be safeguarded in order to uphold the right of dignity. Underlying
the right .. . is the recognition that man is a free entity, who develops
his person and his abilities as he wishes in the society in which he
lives; at the centre of human dignity is the sanctity of human life and
liberty. Underlying human dignity are the autonomy of the individual
will, freedom of choice and freedom of action of the person as a free
entity. Human dignity is based on the recognition of the physical and
spiritual integrity of man, his humanity, his value as a human being, all
of which irrespective of the extent of his usefulness. 1
22
These justices reasoned that, given the meaning and scope of this central
constitutional guarantee, a basic element of the right to human dignity must be
a person's ability to shape freely her family life and to raise her children
accordingly. 123 The right to family life is thus "in the heart" of and "within the
scope of the essence of the right to dignity.'
124
Some justices also found that the right to family life "goes to the heart of
the essence of a human being as a free citizen,"' 25 and thus is protected by the
118. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 97 28, 38; opinion of Jubran, J., 7;
opinion of Procaccia, J., 6) (noting that the right to family life, derived from the rights to life and
dignity, includes the right to marry a person of one's choice in accordance with one's outlook on life; the
right for family members to live together in a location of their choice; the right of parents to realize
parenthood in its entirety, to enjoy a relationship with their children, and not to be severed from them;
and the right of the child to family life); see also HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [1999]
lsrSC 53(2) 728, 782, 787 ("The State of Israel recognizes the right of the citizen to choose for himself a
spouse and to establish with that spouse a family in Israel ... [and] the right of family members to live
together in the place of their choice."); AAA 4614/05 State of Israel v. Oren [2006] (not yet reported)
(opinion of Beinisch, C.J., 11), available at http://www.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titles.asp?build=
2&System=l&Exec=&cpq=l (recognizing "the right to family life, which includes the right of the
individual to choose his partner and to establish a family with him").
119. CA 2245/06 Dvorin v. Prison Auths. [2006] (not yet reported), 12.
120. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Cu. (opinion of Procaccia, J., 6); see also LFA 377/05 Future
Adopting Parents of a Minor v. Biological Parents [2005], 72 Dinim-El 286 (opinion of Procaccia, J.,
6).
121. See the opinions of each of the eleven justices in HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr.
122. HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't in Israel v. Knesset [2006] (not yet reported)
(opinion of Barak, C.J., 35).
123. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion ofBarak, C.J., 32).
124. Id.; see also CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995] isrSC 49(1) 485, 497.
125. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. (opinion of Jubran, J., 10).
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right to liberty, as well as dignity. 126 For the Court, "[i]n establishing his family,
a person shapes the way in which he lives his life and builds his private world.
Therefore, in protecting the right to family life, the law protects the most basic
freedom of the citizen to live his life as an autonomous person, who is free to
make his choices."'
' 27
For other Justices, the right to marry and to enjoy family life is an integral
part of the fundamental right to life.' 28 They explained that the Basic Law
extends protection not only to the "sanctity of life," but also to "the human
right to realize the meaning of life and its raison d'gtre."'129 Since "the right to
family is a raison d'etre without which the ability of man to achieve ... self-
realization is impaired,"' 130 safeguarding the right to life in its full sense
requires protection of the right to family life. Justice Procaccia went on to stress
that, "[a]mong human rights, the human right to family stands on the highest
level. It takes precedence over the right to property, to freedom of occupation
and even to privacy and intimacy. It reflects the essence of the human
experience and the concretization of realizing one's identity."'
31
In addition, some justices have found a basis for the protection of the
family unit in the right to privacy and the right to equality. Justice Barak found
the right to family life in the right "to privacy and to intimacy," although he did
not elaborate on the constitutional nexus between the two concepts. 32 Taking
another path, Justice Rivlin noted that violations of the right to family life may
have "ramifications ... on a defined and distinct sector of the population,
which is also a minority group," in the case at hand the Israeli Arab, thereby
implicating equality rights.' 
33
Thus, the right to family life has been given foundations in the rights to
life, dignity, liberty, privacy, and equality-the most important human rights in
the Israeli Constitution. These same rights, I argue, also demand the recognition
of the constitutional status of marital dissolution; what is more, divorce must be
a component of the right to family life itself if that constitutional guarantee is to
be complete and whole.
126. Id. (opinion of Jubran, J., 8); see id. (opinion of Rivlin, J., 8) (explaining that denying the
right to realize family life "deals a mortal blow to a person's fundamental ability to dictate his life
story.... The right to family life is therefore protected in the provisions of the Basic Law as a part of the
basic right to liberty and as a part of the basic right to dignity.").
127. Id. (opinion ofJubran, J., 7).
128. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty extends constitutional protection to the "life, body or
dignity ofany person." Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 2.
129. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. (opinion of Procaccia, J., 6).
130. Id. ("Without protection for the right to family, human dignity is violated, the right to personal
autonomy is diminished and a person is prevented from sharing his fate with his spouse and children and
having a life together with them.").
131. Id.
132. Id. (opinion of Barak, C.J., 32) (relying on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, art.
7(a)).
133. Id. (opinion ofRivlin, J., 9).
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Marital freedom encompasses a "positive" as well as a "negative" freedom.
Both are crucial for human well-being, 134 and either alone would entitle divorce
to constitutional protection. The positive meaning of marital freedom is
grounded in the right to family life, especially its foundations in dignity and
liberty, while the negative sense is based in the rights to physical and emotional
integrity, dignity, life, equality, and privacy. With the support of these
combined foundations, it will become clear that the right to marital freedom
must enjoy a powerful, supra-legislative constitutional status.
In a formal sense, the "positive" right to divorce corresponds to and
naturally follows from the right to family life, and must therefore enjoy
equivalent constitutional status. Both marriage and divorce allow individuals to
express their identity and their hopes for the future.1 35 Moreover, denial of the
right to divorce, which is also the denial of the right to remarry, is tantamount
to deprivation of the precious opportunity to build a new life in place of what
has come before, and to imbue that life with flavor, substance, and meaning.
136
Since, as the Supreme Court recognized, the "family ties of a person are.., the
centre of his life,"' 37 and "a clear expression of a person's self-realization,"'
138
the denial of the right to divorce and remarry inhibits one's personhood and
self-fulfillment. Such a denial "deals a mortal blow to a person's fundamental
ability to dictate his life story."'
139
In fact, inhibiting divorce and thus remarriage violates the right to dignity
in the same way as would prohibitions on first marriages--in either case, "to
prohibit the establishment of such a relationship impairs the ability of the
individual to achieve personal fulfilment in an aspect of life that is of central
significance."' 140 Indeed, commentators have stressed that marriage, whether a
134. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE xi (1989) ("Divorce has two purposes. The first is to escape the
marriage, which has grown intolerable for at least one person, [what I call a negative liberty]. The
second is to build a new life [or positive liberty]. Everyone who initiates a divorce fervently hopes that
something better will replace the failed marriage-and this second-life-building aspect of divorce turns
out to be far more important than the crisis.").
135. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 671 (1980).
136. Id. (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) for the proposition that "acquiring
one's 'single' associational status" is valuable both in its own right and as the key to remarriage and its
many advantages).
137. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 32). This view of the centrality of
family ties to an individual's life and identity is shared by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984).
138. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion ofBarak, C.J., 32).
139. Id. (opinion of Rivlin, J., 8); see also Karst, supra note 135, at 635-36 (noting that an
individual's intimate associations shape one's "sense of his own identity" and "give him his best chance
to be seen (and thus to see himself) as a whole person rather than as an aggregate of social roles").
140. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Cr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 35) (quoting Dawood v. Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) (S. Afr.)); see also Booysen v. Minister of Home Affairs 2001 (4)
SA 485 (CC) (S. Aft.) (reaffirming the Dawood holding). Interestingly, most people about to remarry
believe they will form better unions and that their new marriages will last a lifetime. This is the case
even with couples entering a third, fourth, or fifth marriage. GWYNN DAVIS & MERVYN MURCH,
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 21 (1988); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 172 (1991).
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first or later marriage, constitutes "the most enriching and liberating
relationship to facilitate human adults to personally develop and achieve their
fullest potential," and "the best setting for the safest and most beneficial
expression of sexual intimacy."' 41 The importance of the right to remarry is
demonstrated in its staggeringly common exercise by divorcees-more than
ninety percent remarry in less than five years, 142 seeking the wealth of physical,
metaphysical, and psychological benefits concomitant to marriage. 143 In fact,
studies have found that a divorcee is even more likely to remarry than a single
person of the same age is to marry.144
Deprivation of the right to divorce violates more than just the right to
remarry. When unmarried individuals are legally barred from marrying the
partners of their choice because those individuals are trapped in moribund
marriages that they are unable to formally dissolve, 145 it can also violate the
right to marry itself.'
46
Further, and most significantly, the constitutionally protected process of
defining one's identity through basic life choices, including marriage, is an
ongoing process rather than a single discrete act.147 As one's self-definition
evolves over time, so too do the basic life choices flowing from that definition.
A crucial part of an individual's ability to "shape[] the way in which he lives
141. Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 780 (2001); see also Lynn D.
Wardle, Conference on Marriage, Families, and Democracy: The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of
Constitutional Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 374-75 (2003).
142. WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 150 (1993); PETER J. RIGA,
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW: HISTORICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 126
(1986); Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 1, 2 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
143. See, e.g., Hara Estroff Marano, Debunking the Marriage Myth: It Works for Women, Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at F7 (citing U.S. research establishing that marriage "lengthens life,
substantially boosts physical and emotional health and raises income over that of single or divorced
people or those who live together"). These findings are consistent with those of other countries as well.
See Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation Study, 60 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 527 (1998); see also George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15
J.L. & POL. 581, 617 (1999) (listing the intangible benefits of marriage and noting that they are a main
reason that same-sex couples seek legal access to marriage).
144. GOODE, supra note 142, at 150.
145. See supra Part I.C.
146. Bigamy is prohibited in Article 176 of the Israeli Penal Code, 1977, S.H. 864. As discussed
supra in Part I, husbands (but not wives) may escape this criminal prohibition by obtaining a rabbinic
permit to remarry while still formally married. Israeli Penal Code, art. 177. Note that the technical
ability to separate and cohabitate is not a proper substitute for marriage. Research suggests that non-
marital relationships are more fragile and less likely to last than those that receive legal recognition. See,
e.g., MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 120, 123 (1993). Thus, the right of
the unmarried individuals to enjoy a stable family life may be seriously curtailed by divorce restrictions.
147. See David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1000 (1979) ("From the
earliest life of the infant to quite old age, the development and exercise of autonomous choice underlies
the deepening individuation of the person.").
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his life and builds his private world," 14 8 inherent in the right to family life, is
thus the chance to change that private world-through, for example, ending a
marriage that is no longer consistent with one's life plan and basic values. The
choice of an intimate partner affects one's entire identity. It transforms one
from being a solitary individual to part of a union, but that union can only
continue while it matches one's self-understanding. Hence, the right to liberty
demands that an individual will not be bound irrevocably to identity-
constituting marital choices made early in life-and so requires an exit through
divorce. 1
49
In sum, underlying the right to divorce are the same values and interests
that entitle family life to rigorous constitutional protection. Indeed, construing
the right to family life to include divorce and remarriage is in line with the
Supreme Court's holding that the meaning of this right is "not exhausted by the
right to marry and to have children."'' 50 Further, this construction follows from
the Court's admonishment that the right to family life is "protected in its
entirety by the Basic Law"' 51 and that it "should be interpreted generously and
liberally... [and] should not be restricted."'
5 2
The positive sense of the right to divorce is also worthy of constitutional
status for the sake of marriage itself.' 53 It is only the ability to exit which gives
148. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior
[2006] (not yet reported) (opinion of Jubran, J., 7 7).
149. Cf Karst, supra note 135, at 637 (noting that "our intimate associations profoundly affect our
personalities and our sense of self," and, when voluntary, they play a part in self-definition); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 563, 612 (1977) (noting that "nothing is more central to self realization and fulfillment" than
decisions about personal associations and other issues central to "our uniqueness and individuality").
150. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. (opinion of Barak, C.J., 27).
151. Id. (opinion of Jubran, J., 8) (emphasis added).
152. Id. (opinion ofRivlin, J., TT 7-8).
153. Some have, of course, argued that divorce diminishes esteem for marriage and undermines the
institution, but this is inconsistent with available evidence on the current status of marriage. "Far from
declining, the popularity of marriage increases .... [E]very relevant social investigation seems to
validate further the enormous strength and growing solidity of marriage as an institution ramifying into
every other sphere of life." DAVIS & MURCH, supra note 140, at 21 (describing British society) (quoting
ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S GROUP, PUTTNG ASUNDER (1966)). Davis and Murch further note that
"[p]aradoxically, the value which people attach to marriage is confirmed by the present high divorce
rate. This is because they get divorced, in large part, in order to remarry.... There is also evidence of
strong commitment to the concept of permanent marriage amongst those who remarry after divorce." Id.
Americans, for instance, still cling as strongly as ever to the ideal of marriage as a lifetime undertaking,
despite the prevalence of divorce in the United States. Commentators further stress that since divorce is
simply a remedy that releases spouses from unworkable marriages, it neither destroys marriages nor
tarnishes the purity of home and family. Disintegration begins long before filing for a divorce, and so a
reduction in marital dissolution would require improving marital relations, not curtailing divorce. RILEY,
supra note 140, at 122. Further, commitment between spouses does not arise from the act of marriage;
over the course of the marriage, what becomes important is the spouse's choice to remain committed of
his or her own free will, rather than because the law commands it. Thus, "easing exit from marriage may
reduce the import of the act of marriage as an initial statement. But once the act of marriage recedes in




meaning and full value to the decision to stay and live together in marriage.
154
As divorce becomes more readily available, "marriage itself takes on a special
significance for its expressive content as a statement that the couple wishes to
identify with each other."155 Indeed, it is only the choice to maintain marriage
that permits full realization of the associational values of caring, commitment,
intimacy, and self-identification that accord marriage its elevated status.1
56
Freedom to choose whether to sustain or end a relationship further heightens
the sense of commitment to marriage by allowing "the cared-for partner [to]
gain[] in self-respect by seeing himself through his caring partner's eyes as one
who is worth being cared for," while "the caring partner affirms her autonomy
and her responsibility by choosing the commitment."' 57 It is precisely the legal
power of exit, then, that "converts the daily life of marriage into a
manifestation of a choice that positively reaffirms spouses' plural identity."
158
The right to divorce not only adds value to the meaning of marriage; it may
also, in fact, further promote marriage as an institution. Restrictions on divorce
may deter individuals from entering into marriage in the first place, making
formal marital union an unattractive endeavor and a costly risk. 159 Further,
divorce protects the status of the current concept of marriage: "If too many cold
and loveless marriages were forcibly preserved, then the entire cultural ideal of
affectionate marriage would be weakened and compromised. Better for the...
bankrupt marriages to dissolve than for the credibility of the institution itself to
be damaged."'
160
Divorce is also an important vehicle to improve marriage, as the threat of
potential exit encourages parties to invest in their relationships and to optimize
the quality of marital life. 16 1 Historically, moreover, a denial or even mere
restriction on divorce has proven detrimental to the institution of the family-
spouses were unfaithful, mistreated, or abandoned one another, or simply lived
separately. 16 2 Thus, the freedom to divorce promotes a deeper and more
meaningful enjoyment of marital rights and can reaffirm family life. 163 By
154. Karst, supra note 135, at 637-38.
155. Id. at 636.
156. Id. at 633, 637-38.
157. Id. at 633.
158. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 87
(2004).
159. The United States and Italy provide instructive examples of this phenomenon. See NELSON
MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD To RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 104-08 (1962);
GOODE, supra note 142, at 65-66.
160. RILEY, supra note 140, at 73 (stating that divorce may purify marriage and make it "the holiest
of earthly institutions"); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 19 (1997).
161. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 158, at 90; see also Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The
Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 568, 599 (2001).
162. RILEY, supra note 140, at 183; see also Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 567
(suggesting that restrictions against divorce and remarriage might result in increased extramarital
cohabitation or bigamy).
163. This is also the approach adopted by Jewish law. In Jewish jurisprudence, the discussion of
divorce law precedes that of marriage law, reflecting the insight that the freedom to divorce is what
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definition, then, a high regard for marriage supports the constitutional stature of
divorce.
In addition to its positive sense, marital exit contains a "negative"
component unrelated to marriage. This element of divorce is a form of self-
defense'64-the right to end one's suffering, to be released from a constant
threat to one's emotional or even physical well-being, and to regain tranquility,
peace, and a reasonable quality of life. 65 Being forced to remain in an
unwanted relationship can cause as much harm as being prevented from
beginning a wanted relationship. 66 Both are substantive constitutional liberties:
Just as we must not prevent others from loving or marrying the person of their
choice, so we must not dictate whether, whom, and for how long others love.
Given the role that divorce can play in liberation from the anger, pain, and
aggravation associated with bad marriages, 167  it is not surprising that
commentators have often stressed the link between divorce and individual
happiness, referring to marital liberty as the "right to happiness" itself.
168
Indeed, writers have even described divorce as a journey from sickness to
health, from darkness into the light, and, more starkly, from slavery to
freedom. 1
69
In this negative sense, a right to marital exit is thus required to secure
several fundamental rights. It is intrinsic to physical and emotional integrity,
the constitutional status of which has long been affirmed by the Israeli Supreme
preserves and strengthens marriage and motivates couples to get married and invest in the relationship.
See ELIYAHU KITOV, A MAN AND His HOME 85-88, 92 (2004).
164. Dagan & Heller, supra note 161, at 568.
165. See BLAKE, supra note 159, at 48-49; J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE
POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 14 (1997) (explaining
that the great emotional content of family relations elevates the stakes in marriage, "making domestic
life delightful when it succeed[s] and devastating when it fail[s]").
166. Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 576; see also Karst, supra note 135, at 638 (noting that
"the two strongest cases for protecting the freedom of intimate association.., are the case of
'consenting adults' who choose to associate with each other, and the case of the unwilling person who is
compelled to maintain an unwanted association with another").
167. RILEY, supra note 140, at 71.
168. This linkage between divorce and happiness is prominent in U.S. discussions of divorce. In the
early twentieth century, for example, advocates of liberal divorce laws declared that the growth of
divorce signaled Americans' "demand for a larger degree of freedom and happiness." WILLIAM E.
CARSON, THE MARRIAGE REVOLT: A STUDY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 445 (1915); see BLAKE,
supra note 159, at 166 (noting that some U.S. legislators advocated lenient divorce proposals as a means
of bringing relief from "a hell on earth" to couples unhappily married); WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at
67 (arguing that an individual's right to divorce is rooted in "the individual's right to have a satisfying
inner life to fulfill his/her needs and desires," and that the "entitlement to divorce was based on the
individual entitlement to pursue inner happiness").
169. WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 69-70. Indeed, divorce is not only an individual right, but also
a psychological resource. The dissolution of the marital bond offers the chance "to make oneself over
from the inside out, to refurbish and express the inner self, and to acquire certain valuable psychological
assets and competencies, such as initiative, assertiveness, and a stronger and better self-image." Id. at 5.
One study, for example, found that both men and women felt leaving marriage gave them a newfound
sense of freedom and control over their personal lives. CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK:
MEN AND WOMEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 165 (1990).
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Court; 170 it enhances the capacity for a self-directed life and thus functions as
an essential element of human dignity; and its contributions to individual well-
being render it important to the right to (a healthy and meaningful) life as
broadly defined in Israeli constitutional jurisprudence.' 71
A secure path of exit is especially critical in guaranteeing these rights for
women, and thus for a constitutional regime committed to gender equality.
Marriage has historically been a tool of institutionalized patriarchal
oppression,' 72 which presupposed female economic dependency, self-sacrifice,
and subservience, and which defined women primarily as wives, mothers, and
daughters.173 Making marriage legally difficult or impossible to leave was part
of keeping women within this "oppressive heterosexual orthodoxy of ascribed
roles and domesticity."' 174 Women have borne a disproportionate share of the
resulting misery of strict divorce laws, with gender bias evident in the
availability of divorce grounds and in the application of the laws.
17 5
To this day, marriage often remains a fundamentally gendered arrangement
and one of the central sites of the sex-based double standards that disadvantage
women. 176 Even with the best of intentions, marriages still tend to slip into
170. See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of
Interior [2006] (not yet reported) (opinion of Barak, C.J., 31); HCJ 4128/02 Man, Nature & Law Israel
Envtl. Prot. Soc'y v. Prime Minister [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 503.
171. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Procaccia, J., 6).
172. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 227 ("Feminist legal writing has exposed the institution
of the patriarchal family as a prime locus of domination and control of women by men, and revealed its
legal regulation as a system that enables and reinforces male supremacy."); David L. Chambers, What
If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95
MICH. L. REV. 447, 451 (1996) ("Marriage signifies hierarchy and dominance, subjugation and the loss
of individual identity."); Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239,
247, 262 (2001) (arguing that marriage has historically been based on unequal social arrangements that
shaped the aspirations and experiences of both sexes to the disadvantage of women); Frantz & Dagan,
supra note 158, at 77, 91; Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994);
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
"Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
173. RIONE TENNENHOUS EISLER, DISSOLUTION: No FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE
FUTURE OF WOMEN 77, 79, 100 (1977) (noting that the law also subjected a woman to domestic
chastisement if she failed to perform services to her husband's satisfaction); Chambers, supra note 172,
at 453; Fineman, supra note 172, at 247; see also THE STATE, THE LAW AND THE FAMILY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Michael D. A. Freeman ed., 1984).
174. Chambers, supra note 172, at 453-54, 451.
175. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 27 (1989);
see also supra Part I.
176. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse (with comments by Katherine T. Bartlett), Sex, Lies, and
Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2559 (1994); Fineman, supra
note 172, at 256 (noting the "persistent gendered divisions of family responsibility" between men and
women). See also the classic research of Jessie Bernard, which added an additional psychotherapeutic
dimension to the feminist critique of traditional marriage, and demonstrated that such marriages were
not simply the source of unequal status for women, but also led to female unhappiness and stunted
personal growth. Indeed, Bernard argued that "[t]o be happy in a relationship which imposes so many
impediments on her, as traditional marriage does, a woman must be slightly ill mentally." JESSIE
BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 51 (2d ed. 1982). Some have challenged Bernard's work; for
such accounts, see WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 52.
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traditional, gendered patterns. 177 This is particularly true in Israel, which is a
family-oriented, traditional society with strong patriarchal elements, where
families continue to unequally assign labor and domestic tasks. 178 The unequal
division of labor and resulting inequality "serve[] to perpetuate the gender
stereotypes that perpetuate subordination."' 7 9 Caught in inegalitarian marriages,
women cannot form "a true plural self' or enjoy the collective goods of
marriage like intimacy, caring, emotional attachment, and commitment.
180
More liberal divorce laws, however, undermine male-dominated marriage
and gender inequality simply by giving women the "freedom to leave."' 181 Not
surprisingly, the advent of liberal divorce law in America was accordingly
perceived as "a splendid enhancement of [women's] status both in marriage
and after" and signified "achievable freedom and societal validation for goals
of self-actualization."' 182 Divorce gave women the chance to "[g]et better by
getting out,"' 183 and thus came to be viewed as a boon and a restoration of their
"natural right of equality."' 184
The separate marital stakes and experiences for men and women
underscore the need for a liberal divorce regime in order to enforce the right to
equality, compensate for the discrimination of traditional marriage, and allow
women the option to improve their lives through divorce. Indeed, while
marriage may become detrimental to women, the freedom to divorce has been
shown to nurture competency in a working world that is more likely to
177. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 19 (1988) (noting that even working wives tended to be expected to perform more
household tasks than their husbands); Fineman, supra note 172, at 255, 270 (describing the failure of
equality and gender-neutrality initiatives to transform practices in many families that continue to reflect
traditional, gendered patterns).
178. Chava Frankfort-Nachmias, Israel: The Myth of Gender Equality, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS: A
GLOBAL VIEW 127, 131 (Lynn Walter ed., 2001). The phenomenon is accentuated due to the centrality
of the military in Israeli culture. Id. at 130-32. The inequality in work performed by women and men has
been established in a number of studies of Israeli families, demonstrating that spouses are "rarely equal
partners" when it comes to household work. Id. at 131. Frankfort-Nachmias concludes that "the
gendered division of labor and the perception that women's role is secondary to men's have made Israeli
women dependent on men and severely limit the choices open to them." Id. at 131-32.
179. RHODE, supra note 175, at 133.
180. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 158, at 91-92. Even more deplorably, women's subordination in
marriage "keep[s] them from moving up the scale of needs toward personal fulfillment and ... realizing
their full human potential." WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 50.
181. DAVIS & MURCH, supra note 140, at 69. Divorce was also shown to reduce the psychological
inequality between men and women. WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 78-79.
182. J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 550-51 (1994); see also EISLER, supra note 173, at 11 (noting that the no-fault
revolution was perceived as a product of either women's liberation or the following "male backlash").
183. DIFONZO, supra note 165, at 24 (noting that socially conditioned subservience to men is
transformed into the "right to exit visa from an unhappy union" and endorsing the proposition that "the
decision whether to divorce should be the woman's because she stakes the most on the marriage
venture"); WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 52.
184. RILEY, supra note 140, at 31; see id. at 4 (noting that supporters of divorce often hoped that it
would eventually lead to equality and reciprocity in marriage); see also WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at
16 (noting that in the United States, divorce has been associated with women's freedoms and
prerogatives since the nation's inception).
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recognize and reward women's intelligence, initiative, and risk-taking. Having
the option of divorce was also found to bolster women's self-esteem, self-
determination, and sense of control and identity to such an extent that "divorce
becomes the defining achievement of women's lives, the great article of their
freedom."'1 85 Divorce is thus not simply a legal remedy for broken marriages,
but rather a potentially constitutive component of the individual female self,
making it a critical element of a legal system and a social order committed to
ensuring gender equality.'
1 86
The constitutional right to divorce may also be solidly based on the right to
privacy. Privacy's constitutional magnitude is so great that it is accorded a
separate and elaborate article in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
187
While Israeli privacy doctrine is significantly under-theorized and under-
developed, 88 it does include at least the two main types of privacy protected
under U.S. constitutional jurisprudence: providing for individual autonomy in
making the "most basic decisions about family and parenthood,"' 8 9 and
recognizing an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters."' 190 The right to marital freedom in Israel should be protected by both
of these concepts of privacy.
First, privacy is implicated in the constitutionally protected "basic freedom
of the individual to live his life as an autonomous person, who is free to make
his choices."'1 91 On one of the few occasions that the Israeli Supreme Court has
specifically addressed the scope and outline of constitutional privacy, the Court
paid special heed to both the institution of marriage and its dissolution, stating
that "[t]he autonomy to establish a family, to plan a family and to bear children
185. WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 61, 64 (arguing that divorce can "define[] a sense of self and
lead[] to greater maturity" and to self-knowledge that is "stimulating and energizing and growth-
enhancing"). Further, "[a]fter being in a long-term marriage in which they tended to deny so much of
themselves, divorce gives many women their first chance to validate their reality, to explore who they
are, to cherish newfound identities, to heal old wounds, and ultimately to take care of themselves." Id. at
55.
186. Id. at 64-65.
187. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 4.
188. This description of underdeveloped Israeli privacy doctrine refers to analysis of the right to
privacy as a "framework" or a "general" right from which specific unenumerated rights may be derived,
as in the U.S. context. This is in contrast to numerous laws and decisions discussing and protecting
privacy rights in themselves, most notably the Protection of Privacy Act, 1981, S.H. 128. For an
extensive overview of the status and application of privacy interests in Israeli law, see Appelfeld Zer
Fisher, Protection of Privacy-An Overview, http://www.patentim.com/forum-articles.asp?ArticlelD=
323&Fnumber=30 (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
189. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); see also Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("'This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment' .. .. A host of cases ... have consistently acknowledged a 'private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."' (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-640 (1974))).
190. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
191. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior
[2006] (not yet reported) (opinion ofJubran, J., T 7).
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is a matter of personal privacy. Human liberty encompasses the freedom of
independent choice on matters of marriage, divorce, childbirth, and many other
private matters within the sphere of personal autonomy."
'1 92
Similarly, the Court has stated that "especially in our turbulent and
complex world, there are few choices in which a person realizes his free will as
much as the choice of the person with whom he will share his life."' 93 The
related choice to exit marriage must fall well within the safeguarded
constitutional boundaries of the right to privacy as among the most intimately
private, life-altering decisions of a lifetime, going to the essence of personhood
and identity. 194 Few decisions in life shape one's entire existence so
fundamentally, and so profoundly express individual autonomy, free will, and
freedom of choice as the decision of whom to love, live with, and possibly
leave. 195 As such, these decisions are constitutionally protected, and while
making them, individuals are entitled to remain within the realm of personal
privacy secured by the Israeli Constitution. 96
The Law Commission of Canada similarly concluded that fidelity to the
principles of autonomy requires recognizing as a fundamental freedom the right
to determine whether and with whom to form marriages and other close
personal relationships. 197 Thus "the state must also avoid direct or indirect
forms of coercive interference with adults' freedom to choose whether or not to
form, or remain in, close personal relationships.
' 98
The right to divorce may further be sheltered under the second type of
privacy recognized in U.S. law. Divorce battles inevitably involve a violation
of privacy in the most literal sense. In Israel, such proceedings force large
amounts of private information into the open: 199 They entail brutal intrusion
192. CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 485, 499 (emphasis added).
193. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. (opinion of Jubran, J., f 3, 7).
194. The Court reasoned that "[i]n an era when 'human dignity' is a protected constitutional basic
right, we should give effect to the human aspiration to realize his personal existence, and for this reason
we should respect his desire to belong to the family unit of which he regards himself to be apart." CA
7155/96 A v. Attorney-General [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 160 (emphasis added); see also CFH 6041/02 A v. B
[2004] IsrSC 58(6) 246, 256 (implying that the fundamental freedom of association also includes the
freedom to disassociate, since it recognizes an individual's right to determine to which family unit they
belong and so which family unit to exit); Karst, supra note 135, at 635-37.
195. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ct. (opinion of Barak, C.J., 32) ("There are few decisions
that shape and affect the life of a person as much as the decision as to the person with whom he will join
his fate and with whom he will establish a family.").
196. Id. (finding that the individual prerogative to shape one's family life according to one's free
will is a fundamental constitutional right).
197. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 18 (2001).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. LIFSHITZ, supra note 62, at 19; see, e.g., Case No. 023559859-21-1 (on appeal, Case No.
023559859-21-1), in 18 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN FAMILY
MATTERS 4-5 (2008); Case No. 017310855-21-1, in 18 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER, supra, at 7; Case
No. 014191472-21-1 (on appeal Case No. 310830138-21-1), in 16 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER:
RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN FAMILY MATTERS 3-4 (2007); Case No. 040135832-21-1, in 15 THE
LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT DECISIONS IN FAMILY MATTERS 3 (2007).
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into the most intimate aspects of one's relationship, including one's physical
and mental diseases, weaknesses, and defects, one's sexual lifestyle, and
sometimes one's entire lifestyle, including religious activity and immodest
behavior.20 0
Some cases are so intimately detailed as to embarrass the reader, let alone
the parties involved.20 ' Whatever the outcome of the case, it "demeans the
marital relationship, humiliates the parties, and damages the residual family
relationships. '" 20 2 It is no wonder that individuals have gone to extreme lengths
to avoid the personal revelations and scandals of a local dissolution hearing-
some travel long (and expensive) distances to get migratory divorces, while
others resort to deception to fake their way to freedom. 203 Strict divorce laws
thus force individuals to choose between their privacy and their marital liberty.
In sum, if the right to marital privacy means anything, it must require that a
person may leave a failing marriage freely, without being interrogated about the
most intimate details of his or her life. Thus, not only a right to divorce, but a
right to divorce without substantive inquiry into the content of a marriage is
necessary to fulfill the constitutional right to privacy.
The paramount importance of marital dissolution to personal happiness and
the need to defend this core human freedom, in both its negative and positive
facets, speak for themselves. The fundamental rights to dignity, liberty,
equality, privacy, and family life all join together to construct a powerful,
supra-legislative right to marital dissolution that enjoys potent constitutional
protection.
B. Constitutional Dimensions of the Current Divorce Regime
Israel's highly discriminatory religious divorce law allows women,
observant and nonobservant alike, only a limited divorce right, and fails to
acknowledge the constitutional status of the rights to both marital liberty and
gender equality. 204 A law that impinges upon these rights must meet the
constitutional requirements of the Limitation Clause, or it is unconstitutional
and void. While the current religious divorce law is immune from constitutional
200. LIFSHITZ, supra note 62, at 19; Naomi R. Calm, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 225, 253 (1997); Joseph Goldstein & Max Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce:
A Model Statute & Commentary, 3 FAM. L. Q. 75, 82 (1969).
201. See, e.g., Case No. 3-21-02371268, in 14 THE LAW AND ITS DECIDER: RABBINICAL COURT
DECISIONS IN FAMILY MATTERS 5-6 (2007); see also SHARSHEVSK, supra note 14, at 304-8, 314-21;
SHiFMAN, supra note 13, at 295-304. For U.S. decisions, see the cases described in BLAKE, supra note
159, at 59-60.
202. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 200, at 82-83.
203. RILEY, supra note 140, at 135-40; Raymond C. O'Brien, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102
W. VA. L. REv. 339, 353 (1999).
204. Yuval Merin, The Right to Family Life and Civil Marriage Under International Law and its
Implementation in the State of Israel, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 79, 136-37 (2005).
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invalidation, 205 the constitutional status of divorce must guide both the
interpretation of the existing law and the development of new legislative policy
concerning divorce.
1. Limitations on the Interpretive Techniques of Divorce Law and the
Adoption of New Religious Doctrines
Divorce laws are immune from invalidation under the Basic Laws, yet they
still must be interpreted and implemented according to the principles of the new
Israeli Constitution, so as to safeguard human rights.20 6 All judicial bodies,
including the rabbinical court, are subject to this interpretive obligation.
20 7
Thus, in this new constitutional era, the rabbinical court's judicial latitude and
discretion are strictly limited. It may no longer adopt and apply religious
doctrines as it sees fit, particularly its stringent and discriminatory
interpretations of divorce law.2°8 Rather, it must champion more liberal
interpretations of Jewish law that are sensitive to women's equality and
dissolution rights. It is thus a grave constitutional transgression for the
rabbinical courts to have recently revitalized the retroactive invalidation
doctrine, which allows the violation of women's dignity and equality rights and
places basic marital liberties under constant threat. Such an unjustified and
unconstitutional doctrine merits immediate invalidation.
In addition to its "negative" duty to refrain from impairing liberty to the
extent possible, the rabbinical court is also subject to a "positive" constitutional
duty to employ available religious tools to further women's rights and marital
freedom. An excellent example of the course the rabbinical court should take
would be extending female divorce grounds to include grounds which have
long been recognized under Jewish law but that are for the most part not
currently considered by the rabbinical court-for example, the "fed-up"
205. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 10.
206. Bracha, supra note 8, at 610-13. Only Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation stipulates explicitly
that old law must be interpreted in the spirit of the directives of the Basic Law. Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992, S.H. 90 art. 10. However, the Court read this interpretive technique into Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty as well. See, e.g., HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authorities
[1996] IsrSC 50(2) 793 (radically reinterpreting a new law to make it compatible with the Basic Law);
CrimA 2316/95 Genimat v. State of Israel [1996] lsrSC 49(4) 589, 653-54 (holding that the meaning of
the "arrest law," as well as the process of weighing the competing governmental and liberty interests,
were changed); FC (TA) 13990/96 Doe v. Doe [1996) (not yet reported) (holding, in a family court
proceeding, that the maintenance law must be interpreted differently and in line with the constitutional
right to equality).
207. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, art. 1I; see, e.g., HCJ 4358/93 Tzuk v. Grand
Rabbinical Court [1994] lsrSC 48(4) 563, 570-72 (holding that the rabbinical court is subject to the
Basic Laws' directives); HCJ 3914/92 Lev v. Rabbinical Court [1994] lsrSC 48(2) 491, 502-03. The
rabbinical court has acknowledged this obligation. See, e.g., Case No. 8621530-64-1 Applebaum v.
Applebaum [1998] (not yet reported).
208. Yechiel S. Kaplan, A New Trend Concerning the Execution of Divorce Decisions, 21
MEHKAREI MISHPAT 608, 632-4 (2005).
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ground, which applies when the wife finds her husband distasteful,2 °9 or the
ground of eighteen months of separation without any chance of
reconciliation. Application of these additional divorce grounds may liberate
large numbers of women and at least ameliorate the shameful practice of get
extortion. These and other religious solutions, developed through the centuries
to tackle the aguna problem, might and should be utilized in the service of the
new constitutional commitment to women's rights.
211
But innovative interpretations of existing religious divorce law, while
important to safeguarding the welfare of women, are not the only constitutional
key available. Another important means is the use of legislatively-conferred
power to induce recalcitrant spouses to release their wives.
2. New Legislative Tactics Aimed at Alleviating Women's Marital Plight
Throughout the years, the Israeli legislature has made some unsuccessful
efforts to address the problems of the aguna.212 After the advent of the
constitutional revolution, however, the Knesset granted the rabbinical court
another powerful tool, authorizing it to deprive recalcitrant spouses of a catalog
of privileges, including the right to exit the country, hold a driver's license or
banking privileges, and pursue employment in state-licensed professions. 213 In
214drastic cases, even incarceration is permissible. This new law, though
infrequently applied, has proven highly effective in "persuading" husbands to
divorce their trapped wives. 2 15 However, the law has far-reaching effects on
fundamental, constitutionally-protected civil rights, and hence it must meet the
parameters of the Limitation Clause to survive.
2 16
209. For a detailed discussion of the "fed-up" ground, see Elimelech Vestraich, The Rise and
Decline of the Wife's Right to Leave Her Husband Without Fault in Medieval Jewish Law, 21 SHNATON
HA'MISHPAT HA'IVRI 123-47 (2000).
210. See the opinion of Rabbi Chaim Palaggi, a noted mid-nineteenth-century Talmudic authority
in his Responsa, 2 Ha-Hayyim Veha-Shalom, no. 112, quoted in Shifman, supra note 19, at 35.
211. See generally SHLOMO RISKIN, WOMEN AND JEWISH DIVORCE: THE REBELLIOUS WIFE, THE
AGUNAH AND THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO INITIATE DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW, A HALAKHIC SOLUTION
(1989); Eliakim Rubinshtein, For the Rescue of Agunot, 26 TCHUMIN 190, 193-98 (2006) (discussing
proposals to solve the aguna problem).
212. See lzhak Shilo, Aginut, in SEFER SHAVA, supra note 63, at 50, 54-55.
213. The Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of Divorce Judgments) Law, 1995, S.H. 139 arts. I-3A.
In its initial formulation, this new law penalized only husbands who refused to comply with the ruling of
a rabbinic court to divorce, but it was amended shortly after, in the name of equality, to include
recalcitrant women as well.
214. Before the new law went into effect, the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and
Divorce) Law, 1953, S.H. 165 art. 6 did allow for imprisonment but it outlined such a cumbersome and
uninviting procedure that it was rarely used.
215. See Shlomo Dichovsky, Enforcement of Divorce, 25 TCHUMIN 132 (2005) (reviewing the
implementation of the new law).
216. Indeed, in two instances, husbands have attempted to question the constitutionality of the new
law, but the Supreme Court dismissed their claims without any judicial review. See HCJ 3068/96
Goldshmit v. Goldshmit [1997] (not yet reported); HCJ 631/96 Even Tzur v. Grand Rabbinical Court
[1997] Tak-El 96(2) 696.
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Application of the Limitation Clause shows that the new law is
constitutionally permissible. First, the rights were impaired through a
legislative act, as required.21 7 Second, this measure is consistent with the values
of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. Judaism views attempts to unchain an
aguna as a lofty goal and encourages the compulsion of recalcitrant husbands
in appropriate cases.2 18 The law also befits Israeli democratic values: It passed
by majority vote, which conforms at the very least to the narrow definition of
democracy.
219
Third, the purpose underlying the new law-to alleviate the plight of get
refusees and to protect their right to divorce-should be considered a proper
one. The law is aimed at counterbalancing men's divorce power, correcting the
inherent gender inequality of the Israeli divorce regime and inhibiting the
widespread phenomenon of get extortion. By facilitating fair and extortion-free
divorce proceedings, the law further supports the rights to remarry, become
parents, and enjoy family life, all of which are fundamental rights of the highest
order. 22 Aiding in the realization of fundamental rights, as this law does, is
ranked as one of the most laudable purposes a law may possibly serve.
221
Fourth, the legislative means chosen are tailored to achieving the law's
purpose, since they encourage a recalcitrant spouse to obey the rabbinical
court's order to divorce, while restricting that spouse's rights as little as
possible. In this regard, it must be acknowledged that the legislature enjoys
broad latitude to select legislative means, 222 and that the list of sanctions
provided was indeed the product of the lawmakers' reasoned deliberations and
balancing processes, designed to target a wide variety of persons, including
those against whom more limited penalties would be ineffective. 3 To
217. Dichovsky, supra note 215, at 132-33.
218. Compulsion may even be exercised by means of physical torture. For Jewish divorce law's
principles, see Yechiel S. Kaplan, Enforcement of Divorce: Judgments by Imprisonment: Principles of
Jewish Law, 15 JEWISH L. ANN. 57-145 (2004). See also Clinton, supra note 4, at 295.
219. Ruth Gavison, Jewish and Democratic State: Political Identity, Ideology and the Law, 19
IYUNEI MISHPAT 631, 644-56 (1995).
220. See supra Part lIi.A; see also Kaplan, supra note 208, at 664.
221. Indeed, "legislation that is intended to protect human rights is certainly for a proper purpose."
CA 6821/93 Unified Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Collective Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 459 (opinion of
Barak, C.J.); see supra Part II.C.
222. See CA 6821/93 Unified Bank Mizrahi, at 495; see also Archibald, supra note 77, at 47. In
HCJ 1715/97 Israel Inv. Managers Ass'n v. Minister of Fin. [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367, 386-87, the
Supreme Court stated:
We must recognize the legislature's room to manoeuvre or the "margin of appreciation"
given to it, which allows it to exercise its discretion in choosing the (proper) purpose and the
means (whose violation of human rights is not excessive) that lie on the edge of the margin
of appreciation. Indeed, we must adopt a flexible approach that recognizes the difficulties
inherent in the legislature's choice, the influence of this choice on the public and the
legislature's institutional advantage.
223. For some husbands, only the loss of their physical liberty is decisive, but for other husbands,
civil economic sanctions may prove more effective. See Michael S. Berger & Deborah E. Lipstadt,
Women in Judaism from the Perspective of Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 295, 314 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds.,
1996); Cwik, supra note 17, at 136-37.
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minimize constitutional concerns, however, the rabbinical court must apply
potential penalties in a graduated fashion, only escalating in severity if less
restrictive measures fail."' The limited duration of these penalties provides
further evidence that the statute is appropriately tailored: It is not punitive and,
accordingly, its effects persist only until a spouse allows the dissolution of a
marriage. 225 Additionally, the legislature sought to assure careful execution of
its new law, instructing the rabbinical court to use its authority sensibly,
support its decisions, and consider the specific circumstances of each case.
226
Lastly, the law is also proportional in the strict sense. While balancing the
spouses' competing rights, the test weighs the importance of the interests at
stake and the extent of their violation. In this case, while the rights of the
husband-the more commonly recalcitrant spouse-may be infringed, that
abridgment is less severe than that which would otherwise be inflicted on the
wife. After all, it is within his power to end the conditional abridgment of his
rights, while that would not be true for his wife without the law. Given the
particular importance of the fundamental guarantee to divorce in the Israeli
Constitution,227 and the temporary and conditional nature of the curtailment of
the husband's rights, the wife's marital liberty outweighs the interests of her
husband in these circumstances.
228
In sum, the curtailment of the recalcitrant spouses' rights required by the
new law satisfies the four-pronged constitutional test: It is authorized by law,
consistent with Israel's Jewish and democratic values, for a proper purpose, and
proportional.
In fact, the new law is not merely constitutional; the absence of such a law
would be incompatible with a constitution that supports marital rights through a
right to divorce. Israeli constitutional law, unlike the U.S. model, 229 does not
just establish a "negative" constitutional duty of state noninterference in
individual's freedom of choice. It imposes a "positive" duty to act, requiring
224. Thus, property rights should be targeted first, followed as necessary by occupational liberties,
traveling rights, and ultimately, in the most severe cases, physical freedom. See Kaplan, supra note 208,
at 668-69. Kaplan also notes that the original bill included more restrictive means that were eventually
left out to minimize the curtailment of spouses' rights. Id. at 668.
225. Id. at 666. Thus, the impairment of husbandly rights is only conditional. The keys to restoring
his suspended privileges are found in his own pocket: As soon as he releases his wife from the chains of
marriage, he is also entitled to his freedom. See HCJ 631/96 Even Tzur v. Grand Rabbinical Court
[1997] Tak-El 96(2) 696.
226. Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of Divorce Judgments) Law, 1995, S.H. 139 art. 4; see
Kaplan, supra note 208, at 692-95.
227. CA 377/05 Doe v. Doe [2005] IsrSC 60(1) 124; see HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab
Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [2006] (opinion of Procaccia, J., 6).
228. HCJ 6893/05 Levi v. Gov't [2005] Tak-El 2005(3) 1417, 1423 (holding that the more
fundamental the right, the more powerful the governmental interest must be in order to justify
impairment).
229. Barbara Stark, Rhetoric, Divorce and International Human Rights: The Limits of Divorce
Reform for the Protection of Children, 65 LA. L. REV. 1433, 1441 (2005) ("negative rights are firmly
enshrined in constitutional jurisprudence," while "positive rights have never established a foothold in
American jurisprudence").
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affirmative state intervention to further implement fundamental rights. 3 ° Thus,
the legislature must both refrain from abridging women's divorce rights and
provide remedies for the meaningful vindication of those entitlements. In
particular, the legislature must confront husbands' exploitation of their wives'
religious beliefs and correct the disparity in spousal bargaining power. The
Knesset, however, has failed to live up fully to its positive constitutional
responsibility.
While the new law included a variety of penalties to encourage compliance
with divorce orders, some far-reaching, it passed over one relatively
unrestrictive remedy-higher pre-divorce support payments. In fact, such a
provision was deleted from the final draft of the bill.231 Its omission is
particularly unfortunate because this measure would be highly useful, not only
because it would provide a meaningful financial deterrent for recalcitrant
husbands, which would also directly benefit the recipient woman, but also
because it is the means that the rabbinical court is most willing to apply.
232
Indeed, the rabbinical court has proven unsympathetic to using the means that
actually were included in the new law.233 Given the fundamental character of
the right to divorce and the especially scrupulous protection it deserves, adding
this tool to the set of measures available for use against recalcitrant spouses is
necessary for the Knesset to meet its constitutional obligation to defend marital
freedom.
C. Constitutional Assessment of Potential Developments
In addition to its implications for the existing divorce regime, a
constitutional right to marital freedom provides a standard by which to
understand and constrain existing proposals for reforming the system of divorce
law. Indeed, any new amendment to the current divorce regime might be
234attacked as a violation of the constitution. Divorce reforms, therefore, cannot
230. 3 BARAK, supra note 90, at 261-63; see, e.g., HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Soc.
Justice Ass'n v. Ministry of Treasury [2005] (not yet reported), available at http://webl.nevo.co.il/
serve/home/it/titles.asp?build=2&System=I&Exec=& cpq-1; HCJ 161/94 Atarri v. State of Israel
[1994] (not yet reported). For the classification of state duties as negative and positive, see Bracha,
supra note 8, at 591-606; and Merin, supra note 204, at 92-94.
231. See Draft Bill Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of Divorce Decrees) Law, 1994, HH, 495 art.
7. For a brief discussion of the American model on this issue, see Gidon Sapir, Religion and State-A
Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 579, 585 n.9 (1999).
232. Shlomo Dichovsky, Monetary Enforcement Measures Against Recalcitrant Husbands, 26
TCHUMIN 173, 177 (arguing that this sanction is religiously undisputed and might be employed even
when the court only "orders" divorce but does not use compulsory language); see also Bleich, supra
note 4, at 172-73 (explaining that this remedy is not considered to be an illegitimate means of coercing a
get); Kaplan, supra note 208, at 633-34; Pinchas Shifman, Jewish Law in the Decisions of the Courts, 13
SHNATON HA'MISHPAT HA'lIVu 371, 371-72 (1987).
233. Kaplan, supra note 208, at 696-99.
234. CA 6821/93 Unified Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Collective Vill. [1995] lsrSC 49(4) 221, 489
(opinion of Barak, C.J.).
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merely constitute a substantial improvement on the old regime, but must fully
conform to constitutional norms to retain their legitimacy.
2 35
As described above in Part II, the leading proposals envision three different
models of divorce regulation reform. The first model would create a unified
marriage system that applies to all citizens, while the other two call for the
establishment of two coexisting marital tracks: the old religious regime,
supplemented by a civil option-a "spousal covenant"236-for use by the
overwhelming majority of Israelis who do not want religion to govern their
marital choices. 237 None of these models, however, properly account for the
fundamental character of the right to marital dissolution. The following
analysis aims to provide this missing constitutional consideration, in order to
define the permissible legislative bounds within which to debate competing
models. The models are discussed below from most to least restrictive of the
divorce right.
1. The Gavison-Medan Covenant: A (Re)Callfor Fault-Based Divorce
The Gavison-Medan Covenant seeks to balance two competing interests:
Jewish law and freedom of religion. Thus, in its provision regulating marriage,
civil-secular principles govern, but in the regulation of divorce, civil law yields
to religion, granting Jewish law control.238 The model thus retains the religious
divorce system, which focuses on fault-based grounds for marital
dissolution. 239 Given the constitutional nature of the right to divorce, I contend
that a fault-based regime would fail to clear the Limitation Clause's
235. HCJ 9333/03 Kniel v. Gov't [2005] IsrSC 60 277, 21; HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of
Def. [1997] IsrSC 53(5) 241, 258 (invalidating a new provision regarding the arrest of soldiers despite
the improvements for the situation of detained soldiers created by that provision).
236. See, e.g., Ariel Rozen-Tzvi, The Rabbinical Court, Halacha, and the Public: A Very Narrow
Bridge, 3 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 173 (1995). Note the creation by some American states of a two-tiered
system of marriage: the traditional marriage contract, with minimal formalities of formation and
dissolution, and a "covenant" marriage, which imposes heightened requirements for both entrance to and
exit from the union. This system has been adopted by Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona, and other states
are considering similar proposals. See generally Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Study of Covenant
Marriage Proposals in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31 (1999).
237. In Israeli Jewish society, sixteen percent of the population is considered religious or ultra-
Orthodox, while the vast majority does not identify as religious (almost forty percent are "traditional,"
following only religious practices that are considered cultural, such as Jewish holidays, and over forty
percent define themselves as secular). See Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion: Funding of Religious
Institutions-The Case of Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB.
POL'Y 421, 449 (1999).
238. See Yaacov Medan, Explanatory Memorandum to the Gavison-Medan Covenant, in GAVISON
& MEDAN, supra note 64, at 51-52.
239. The Gavison-Medan model also provides for civil dissolution of marriage. However, such an
arrangement is not an "absolute" divorce, but more similar to a legally-codified separation, and thus it
will not be analyzed here. The following discussion instead focuses generally on the constitutional status
of fault-based divorce regimes, not only the one envisioned by the Gavison-Medan model. For
discussion of historical variations on the basic fault regime model, see the work of Lawrence M.
Friedman, especially A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REv.
1497 (2000). See generally BLAKE, supra note 159.
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constitutional bar. Admittedly, like other rights, the dissolution right is not
absolute; it may be infringed for the sake of powerful countervailing interests,
provided that the infringement is no greater than is required.240 However, even
if we posit that such a law would be consistent with the values of Israel and is
for a proper purpose-designed to protect both the marital institution and
children's welfare24 1-it would still impair the right to divorce too much to be
constitutionally acceptable.
Conditioning divorce on a showing of fault may prove to be impermissibly
intrusive into the marital relationship and spouses' private lives. A survey of
courts' decisions in fault-based divorce actions reveals a focus on the most
intimate and private moments of marriage, which disdains the right to marital
privacy and actually encourages violations of this privacy both inside and
outside of the courtroom.
242
Moreover, the restrictions on divorce embedded in a fault-based regime are
severe. The road to marital freedom is only open for an "innocent" spouse
against a "guilty" partner, as defined by law. 243 Thus, fault divorce sentences
numerous individuals to suffer in marriages that are over for all practical
240. As Chief Justice Barak explained with regard to the right to equality, "the right to equality,
like all other human rights, is not an 'absolute' right. It is of a 'relative' nature. This relativity is reflected
in the possibility of violating it lawfully, if the conditions of the limitations clause are satisfied." See
HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Comm. for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [2006] 1 IsrLR
105 (opinion of Barak, C.J., 22); see also LCA 3145/99 Bank Leumi of Israel Ltd. v. Hazan [2003]
IsrSC 57(5) 385, 405 ("The basic rights, even though they are supreme rights of a constitutional nature,
are not absolute, but they arise from a reality that requires balances to be struck between the duty to
uphold important rights of the individual and the need to provide a solution to other worthy interests,
whether of an individual or of the public .... ").
241. When a fault regime is also based on religion, as is the case under the Gavison-Medan model,
it gives rise to another proper purpose in support of its enactment-the preservation of the cohesiveness
and unity of Israeli Jewish society. As explained in Part I.C, absent religious divorce, women are
prohibited from remarriage; if they violate this prohibition, the offspring of any such marriage would be
deemed illegitimate and forever barred from marrying within the Jewish community. Consequently, an
unbridgeable rift would exist between orthodox and secular Jews, with the former being unable to marry
the latter, thus irreparably dividing the Jewish people into two nations. Hence, the reason for requiring a
religious divorce is not religious per se, but a cultural-national one, which would avoid the need for
genealogical records and danger of a national schism. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
242. See LIFSHITZ, supra note 62, at 19. The violation of privacy inherent in any divorce law based
on fault is exacerbated in the Israeli context, since photographs and other such evidence of adultery
might be admissible in rabbinical court divorce proceedings even if they were obtained through a
violation of privacy. This practice creates a strong incentive for such violations. See Ruth Zafran, Sex,
Lies, and Videotape: On the Protection of Privacy in Procedures Conducted in the Rabbinical Courts, 7
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 811 (2005); see also HCJ 6650/04 Jane Doe v. Rabbinical Court [2006] (not yet
reported) (criticizing the use of incriminating photographs as a basis for a divorce order, due to the
resulting severe and pernicious harms on the right to privacy).
243. Note also that formulations invoking specific fault grounds and casting the parties in the role
of "innocent" and "guilty" do not account for the complex psychological makeup of conjugal
relationships. In particular, they place too much emphasis on particular kinds of statutorily-specified
endings while undervaluing other elements of conduct during marriage. See Bennett Woodhouse, supra
note 176, at 2546-47; see also DIFONZO, supra note 165, at 49-50 (criticizing fault-based divorce for
focusing solely on statutorily-enumerated fault grounds rather than evaluating the health of a marriage as
a whole).
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purposes, yet in which no recognized "fault" has been committed.244 Indeed,
the fault-based regime has forced couples to engage in subterfuge, perjury, and
deception in order to escape broken marriages. 245 What's more, mutual fault
can trump an otherwise valid divorce action and effectively allow a defending
spouse to "admit even the most repellent charges made in the complaint and
still prevent the plaintiff from securing a divorce." 246 Ironically, therefore, the
case in which divorce seems most compelling-when both parties are at fault-
is the case in which they are most deprived of marital release. Marriage then
becomes a form of punishment for couples who mistreat each other.
Consequently, the fault system both unduly burdens marital freedom and
247diminishes respect and esteem for the fundamental institution of marriage.
The stringent limitations on the right to divorce imposed by a fault-based
system are particularly problematic from a constitutional perspective, given that
they are not accompanied by societal benefits of a corresponding magnitude.
The state interest is in preserving viable marriages, not maintaining formal
unions that are in reality empty shells.248 When the original marital ties fade,
the state's main legislative concern must be minimizing the damage to the
residual and reorganized family relationship. 249 Yet investigating the identity of
the culprit, as required by fault-based regimes, does just the opposite: It
aggravates tension and animosity between spouses, and "exacerbates the
244. See, e.g., McCurry v. McCurry, 10 A.2d 365 (Conn. 1939); Yosko v. Yosko, 97 S.W.2d 1023
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936). It should also be stressed that for "every married couple that enters the divorce
courts, there are uncounted numbers that remain under one roof," suffering through emotional, if not de
jure, divorce. Nathan W. Ackerman, Divorce and Alienation in Modern Society, in JEWS AND DIVORCE
91, 97 (Jacob Freid ed., 1968); see also Karst, supra note 135, at 671 (conditioning divorce on a
showing of fault places "an insuperable burden on some spouses, and thus ... interfere[s] very
significantly with such a spouse's decision to associate with another person in marriage").
245. WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 39-40; Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce
Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 659-60 (1984). When American divorce regimes
were based on fault, collusion was notoriously "common, ordinary, typical, and everybody-certainly
all the judges and lawyers-knew" that divorce-minded couples fabricated evidence to pave their way
out of a moribund marriage. Friedman, supra note 239, at 1506.
246. J.G. Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 213 (1942).
247. "It is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when the courts use it as a
device for punishment." De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1952) (en banc).
248. As the Idaho Supreme Court aptly explained in Howay v. Howay:
The proposition is universally accepted that the state has a paramount interest in marriage
and divorce.... However, the state is not the author of man.... When the marriage
relationship has completely and finally broken down and the relations of the parties have
reached an impasse where reconciliation is impossible and the family unit has ceased to exist,
no rule or regulation promulgated by authority of the state can restore it. The object of the
state's protection has ceased to exist.
264 P.2d 691, 697 (Idaho 1953); see also De Burgh, 250 P.2d at 601 ("[W]hen a marriage has failed and
the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will be
permitted. 'Public policy does not discourage divorce where the relations between husband and wife are
such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed."' (quoting Hill v. Hill, 142
P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1943))).
249. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 200, at 78.
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aggressive forces" undermining families.250  The fault-based regime thus
undercuts the inter-parental post-divorce relationships that are central to
children's adjustment and well-being,251 and by so doing, runs counter to state
interests.
Finally, the limitations on marital exit harm women's equality.
Historically, restrictions on divorce have been a means to cement hierarchical
relations as an organizing principle of marriage and to establish the "right" of
husbands to obedience. 2 Traditional fault grounds, in particular, inherently
reflected "both the gender-based expectations of the traditional marriage
contract and the double standard applied to men's and women's sexual
behavior." 253 A fault regime was thus a sophisticated means of maintaining
husbands' authority and reinforcing female dependence on men within a
patriarchal family structure. 254 For example, under the American fault system, a
woman's failure to conform to the traditional role of wife and mother was a
sufficient ground for the husband to force a divorce and evade alimony claims;
a husband's behavior, however, would not be grounds for divorce unless he
completely abandoned his wife financially or repeatedly abused her.255 The
same inequality of treatment applied to the adultery ground and even lack of
chastity before marriage, working to the detriment of women.256
Even if this discriminatory motivation is not at work, divorce restrictions
may still be constitutionally suspect. Under the Israeli Supreme Court's
equality jurisprudence, the right to equality is violated not only when a law is
tainted with improper or discriminatory considerations, but also when the law
causes a disparate impact on groups within Israeli society in practice.
257
250. Id. at 81. Minimizing parental conflict leads to more well-adjusted children, who are less
likely to need mental health treatment, engage in anti-social behavior, or experience problems at school,
and who are more able to form stable and healthy families of their own when they grow up. See Carol J.
King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
375,432 (1999).
251. Catherine C. Ayoub, Robin M. Deutsch & Andronicki Maraganore, Emotional Distress in
Children of High Conflict Divorce: The Impact of Marital Conflict and Violence, 37 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297, 299 (1999); Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision
Making About Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 145, 160 (2003) (noting increasing evidence connecting the level of parental conflict with poor post-
divorce adjustment of children).
252. See, e.g., Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French
Divorce Law Sounds a Warning About the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American
Marriage Movement, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 321, 322 (2002) (stating that anti-divorce campaigners
aimed to "reinforce the dependence of women on men within a hierarchical family structure").
253. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1110-11 (1989).
254. Id. at 1113.
255. Id. at 1111.
256. Id.
257. Thus, a law can be a violation of the right to equality even when there is no intention to
discriminate. See, e.g., HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Comm. for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime
Minister [2006] (1) IsrLR 105 (opinion of Barak, C.J., 18) ("[Plrohibited discrimination may also
occur without any discriminatory intention or motive on the part of the persons creating the
discriminatory norm. Where discrimination is concerned, the discriminatory outcome is sufficient."); see
also HCJ 2671/98 Israel Women's Network v. Minister of Labour & Soc. Affairs [1998] lsrSC 52(3)
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Divorce restrictions, especially fault requirements, add procedural delays,
complications, and expense to the divorce process, which create a
disproportionate burden for women in their quest for marital freedom.258 Thus,
since women as a group are substantially poorer than men, and even women
who are well-off are usually poorer than their husbands, men's deeper pockets
give them a substantial advantage over women in a contest for a divorce
decree.259 The obstacles posed by fault divorce are exacerbated for spouses who
are trying to escape abusive marriages, usually women. 26 Fault barriers hence
lead to de facto inequality between men and women, and as such are
constitutionally suspect.
The discriminatory nature of fault-based restrictions is further accentuated
by the resulting duration of the restriction. By burdening divorce, the fault
regime creates an additional disparate impact on women, because a delay on
marital release significantly diminishes women's ability to exercise the right to
remarry and bear children in a new relationship. 26 1 Men's prospects of
remarriage and fertility, by contrast, are time-sensitive only to a very limited
degree.262 Given such unequal effects of restrictions on the right to divorce, it is
constitutionally necessary for divorce law to correct them.
The gender inequality is reinforced by another feature of fault-based
systems: the reliance on judges-in Israel, highly conservative rabbinical court
judges-to define what constitutes "fault." These definitions are often
influenced by gender bias and cultural assumptions about women and their
"proper" social and familial roles.263 Indeed, the fault regime has led to the
630, 654; HCJ 721/94 El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749, 759; HCJ
104/87 Nevo v. Nat'l Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4) 749, 759. This is a much broader view of equal
protection than exists in American constitutional law. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
258. In the United States, for example, it was found that the entire divorce process is shaped by the
inability of many women to afford proper representation. Thus, the financial ability to litigate is a major
barrier to women's access to courts, and even when they do litigate, rarely can they afford lengthy
divorce proceedings. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in WOMEN AS SINGLE
PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE
HOUSING MARKET 39,44 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988).
259. Id. at 40.
260. Indeed, in the United States for instance, the vast majority of unilateral divorce petitions have
been filed by women, who frequently cite domestic violence as a basis for their petitions. See Margaret
F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why Most Divorce Filers Are
Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000); Martha Heller, Should Breaking Up Be Harder to Do?:
The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have Upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 263 (1996); Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their
Children After Divorce: The American Law Institute's Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393,
393 (1999).
261. American studies found that while seventy-five percent of divorced women under thirty will
remarry, that percent drops to fifty percent for women aged thirty to forty. GOODE, supra note 142, at
152.
262. For instance, while only twenty-eight percent of women over forty have a chance to get
remarried, most men over forty are still likely to remarry. Id.
263. See EISLER, supra note 173, at 190; see also D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 542-43 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the
double standard that once governed the consideration of adultery as a ground for divorce); Jane Biondi,
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reinforcement of a hierarchical model of marriage in every aspect of judicial
decisionmaking; it cultivates an overt double standard of sexuality, tyrannical
behavior on the part of husbands, and female dependency and
submissiveness.264
In conclusion, a fault-based regime conflicts sharply with the right to
divorce and fails to clear the hurdles of the Limitation Clause. Only a fault-free
regime, which does not rely on any considerations of blame, could pass
constitutional muster; even a mixed-ground regime, combining no-fault
grounds alongside fault-based grounds, would be impermissible. 265 The
remaining question is whether being based on a pure no-fault avenue to divorce
will in itself allow a regime to survive constitutional attack. As the discussion
of the next proposed model indicates, there is no such simple answer.
2. The IDI Model" Experimentation With a No-Fault Concept of Divorce
The next model, developed by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), is
based on a no-fault approach, the only type of approach that may be allowed
into the constitutional sanctuary of the right to divorce. Unlike fault-based
divorce, fault-free regimes serve state interests well. They protect families by
allowing couples to end destructive marriages, leaving society with healthy
rather than non-functional marriages and allowing former partners to move on
to stronger and more productive relationships. 266 This system benefits not only
the individuals involved, but also their children and society at large.267
Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and
Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 611, 625 (1999) (arguing that gender plays a role in assessing
fault in divorce actions and that courts use sexist application of fault laws); Laura Bradford, The
Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN L. REv.
607, 634-35 (1997); Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 1, 3 (1990); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA.
L. REv. 181, 186 (1990).
264. See MARY Jo FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 141-45 (1992) (discussing how legal
rules influence female sexuality); Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 176, at 2529 (arguing that when
judges make judgments about marital fault, "traditional biases about gender roles and sexuality often
distort a court's interpretations of events and their meaning" and arguing that the fault-based divorce
regime reinforces stereotypes about women's sexuality and reflects an obsession with controlling
women and a double standard that rewards heterosexual males, and perpetuates sex-based stereotypes);
see also Constance Backhouse, "Pure Patriarchy": Nineteenth-Century Canadian Marriage, 31
MCGILL L.J. 264, 291-312 (1986) (surveying Canadian cases).
265. A mixed-ground regime combines no-fault grounds (such as separation for a defined period or
irretrievable breakdown of marriage) alongside fault-based grounds and defenses. This allows the parties
two legal avenues to obtain divorce. To date, more than half of the jurisdictions in the United States
reflect this regime. See Matthew Butler, Grounds for Divorce: A Survey, II J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
164, 166 (2000).
266. Christopher Lasch, Divorce and the Family in America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1966, at
57-61; see also RILEY, supra note 140, at 72. Some commentators argue instead that no-fault divorce
law promotes divorce and conveys the message that "an unsatisfying marriage should be set aside even
if it is not miserable." See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children's Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 95, 101 (2001). Such an argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the content of
divorce rules does not have nearly so strong an influence: The impact of legal change on the divorce rate
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In addition, fault-free regimes challenge traditional gender norms, support
an ideal of marriage as an equal partnership of autonomous individuals, 268 and
or on attitudes toward divorce is at best unclear, and it seems more likely that social norms influence law
more than the law influences social norms. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation
of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1969-70 (2000). For instance, "every study of the impact of [no-
fault] laws on divorce rates has concluded that no relationship existed between the introduction of no-
fault and the rise in divorce." JACOB, supra note 177, at 162. Indeed, in Sweden, while divorce law was
liberalized comparatively early, the divorce rate has always been lower than that of the United States.
The rate in Japan, where divorce is extremely easy, is even lower than that of Sweden. See Eric V.
Wicks, Fault-Based Divorce "Reforms, " Archaic Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
1565, 1571-72 (2000). Second, divorce is a momentous decision: it is a disorganizing, unsettling, and
extremely traumatic life experience. Karen Tumage Boyd, The Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated
Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 609, 625 (2006); Michael A. Robbins, Divorce Reform: We Need New Solutions, Not a Return
to Fault, 79 MICH. B.J. 190, 192 (2000) (noting that most people cite divorce as "the worst thing they
have ever experienced"). Divorce is accompanied by significant physical, physiological, and legal
consequences. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 54-55. The decision to divorce is thus normally
taken with the utmost seriousness, especially when children are involved. The presence of children may
place pressures on parents, particularly women, "to remain in unhappy, even dangerous marriages... as
well as to devote themselves to fixing or enduring, rather than exiting, the marriage." Id. at 64.
Beginning in the 1930s, sociologists began to demonstrate, for example, that the divorce rate was higher
among childless couples than among parents. See BLAKE, supra note 159, at 229. Interviews with
divorced couples illustrate that "people will put up with an extraordinary amount-years of
unhappiness-in order to try to keep their marriage and family together." DAVIS & MURCH, supra note
140, at 35-36; see id. at 155 (concluding that very few decisions to divorce are made impetuously);
DIFONZO, supra note 165, at 13-14 (1997) (noting that most divorces occur after years of working to
make the marriage survive); Monard Paulsen, Divorce-Canterbury Style, I VAL. U. L. REV. 93, 96
(1966) (describing the participants in a typical divorce case as "a tragic, weary couple who concluded
after years of sincere efforts to make the marriage succeed that the pain should cease"). Further, most
divorce-seeking couples are unaware of, let alone materially influenced by, divorce law; whatever
impact it does have is vastly overshadowed by other cultural influences, such as gender, race, religious
tradition, socioeconomic status, and personal family history. JACOB, supra note 177, at 147 (noting that
couples rarely knew the content of divorce laws before meeting with an attorney); REGAN, supra note
146, at 176. At most, divorce rules become meaningful only after an "emotional divorce" has taken
place and the couple decides to separate. See Friedman, supra note 239, at 1499.
267. It should be emphasized that marital strife and dysfunctional family relationships, and not
divorce, were found to be the cause of children's most serious emotional problems. Accordingly many
researchers have concluded that divorce can improve, rather than damage, children's welfare and well-
being by eliminating the conflict. See, e.g., Brenda L. Bacon & Brad McKenzie, Parent Education After
Separation/Divorce: Impact of the Level of Parental Conflict on Outcomes, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 85, 86
(2004); Karen R. Blaisure & Margie J. Geasler, Results of a Survey of Court-Connected Parent
Education Programs in U.S. Counties, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 23-40 (1996); E. Mavis
Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING & CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233-88 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982);
Joan B. Kelly, Children's Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage and Divorce: A Decade of Review of
Research, 39 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 963 (2000).
268. Indeed, supporters of no-fault divorce believe "that the ease of divorce would eventually lead
to equality and reciprocity in marriage." RILEY, supra note 140. No-fault divorce encourages increased
participation of women in the labor force and female economic independence. It also supports the notion
of shared parenting, which many studies have suggested as a way of decreasing the rigidity of gender
roles, providing a less gendered environment for children. Weakening gender roles in this way also
increases economic opportunity for women, who will no longer be seen as marginal employees because
of putative childcare responsibilities. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 205-09 (1978); DOROTHY
DINNERSTEN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE
110-14 (Other Press 1999) (1976); RILEY, supra note 140, at 4; David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 533-37 (1984); Herma Hill
Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
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provide an exit that is a crucial safeguard for women's dignity, health, safety,
and sometimes their very lives.2 69 Indeed, no-fault divorce laws were at least in
part motivated by new perceptions about sexual equality and the desire to
eliminate gender-based presumptions and double standards.
270
However, the no-fault version envisaged by this model still places limits on
the parties' ability to free themselves from marriage, such as the imposition of a
mandatory waiting period before a divorce can be obtained. True, "soft" and
temporary constraints on exit may prove compatible with the right to divorce, if
they work to ensure a responsible exercise thereof. 271 Imposing a short waiting
period may allow transitory emotions to cool and encourage due reflection and
attempts at reconciliation, thus safeguarding against possibly impulsive
decisions in this crucial life choice. 272 However, as the analysis of the IDI
model will show, the proper purpose served by reasonable "cooling-off'
periods does not constitutionally justify this type of divorce restriction under all
circumstances. Further, the distinction that this model does make in imposing
waiting periods-between consensual and contested divorce-is problematic.
The constitutionally-proper distinction should instead be based on the presence
of minor children.
273
In its role as parens patriae,274 protection of children is one of the state's
most compelling interests. 275 This creates important implications for divorce
law's treatment of couples with children.276 The state's obligation to protect its
youngest and most helpless citizens is critical, as the very survival and
prosperity of any nation depends upon the health and well-being of its
children.277 Israeli jurisprudence has thus repeatedly emphasized the strength of
1, 80-90 (1987); Shahar Lifshitz, I Want to Get Divorced Now! On the Civil Regulation of Divorce, 28
IYUNEI MISHPAT 671, 711-12 (2005); Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, supra
note 266, at 1950.
269. Feminists feared that restricted divorce provisions would force wives to remain in harmful
marriages, while liberal divorce laws offered protection to wives by allowing them to escape destructive
marriages. RILEY, supra note 140, at 118, 135; JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF
DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE-TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 260 (1991); Judith Stacey, Good
Riddance to "the Family": A Response to David Popenoe, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 545, 545-47 (1993).
270. See, e.g., Thomas M. Mulroy, No-Fault Divorce-Are Women Losing the Battle?, 75 A.B.A. J.
76, 76 (1989).
271. Dagan & Heller, supra note 161, at 568-69, 599-600; Frantz & Dagan, supra note 158, at 88.
272. Dagan & Heller, supra note 161, at 600.
273. This is the law governing divorce in Virginia, for instance. Under Virginia divorce law,
childless couples can obtain a divorce after six months separation, while the period is one year for
couples with minor children. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Supp. 2008).
274. According to the parens patriae doctrine, the government has an obligation to protect
individuals who cannot protect themselves, including children, the elderly, and the insane. See, e.g.,
Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 (2007).
275. See HCJ 979/99 Carlo (a minor) v. Minister of the Interior [2000] (not yet reported) (opinion
of Beinisch, J., 2); see also PETER J. RIGA, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW: HISTORICAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (1986).
276. Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 577 n.58.
277. Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1998).
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the state interest in protecting the family and safeguarding children's
welfare. 278 Additionally, the two-parent family occupies a singularly important
role in Israeli culture; marriage, in Israel and elsewhere, is perceived as the
optimal site for the upbringing and protection of children, offering myriad
physical, emotional, psychological, and economic benefits.279 Moreover, the
reality of unhappy marriages may prove distinctly better for children than that
of divorce in certain instances.280 Studies have confirmed that the welfare of
children of divorce ranks lower than that of children of intact marriages by
every measure of well-being.28 1 For instance, in addition to the emotional and
282psychological problems that may come with a family dissolution, children of
278. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior
[2006] (not yet reported) (opinion of Barak, C.J., 25-26) ("[T]he family relationship, and the
protection of the family and its basic elements (the spouses and their children) lie at the basis of Israeli
law.... Protection of the family unit finds special expression when the family unit includes a minor.
This protection is required both by the right of the parents to raise their children, and by the rights of the
child himself."). For similar statements in the U.S. context, see, for example, New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling.' ... Accordingly,
we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even
when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights." (citation
omitted)).
279. See, e.g., Alice Shavley, The Status of the Woman and Gender Equality in Israel,
http://lib.cet.ac.ilVPages/item.asp?item=2277 (last visited Dec. 11, 2008) (stressing the importance of
family in Israeli society because "the demographic need in preserving the Jewish majority in the country
and the bitter historical experience of persecutions and war-all rendered the existence and perseverance
of the family unit a value of supreme importance ... to the survival of the entire Jewish nation"). The
Israeli Supreme Court has long recognized that "the family unit is the basic unit ... of Israeli society."
CA 238/53 Cohen v. Attomey-General [1954] 8 IsrSC 4, 53 (quotation omitted). Indeed,
"[p]rotecting the institution of the family is a part of public policy in Israel. In the context of the family
unit, protecting the institution of marriage is a central social value ... there is a supreme public interest
in protecting this status and in regulating ... the scope of rights and duties that formulate it." HCJ
693/91 Efrat v. Dir. of Population Registry, Ministry of Interior [ 1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749, 783.
280. The research literature exploring the impact of divorce on children is complex and seems to
have gone through three stages of development, in line with the public's views about children and
divorce. During the first stage, divorce was viewed as harmful to children and thus the framework of
marriage was almost always preferred. During the second stage, research emphasized that the happiness
of individual parents, rather than the presence of an intact marriage, was the key determinant of
children's well-being and that children fared better after divorce than in a disintegrating marriage.
Today, the accumulated evidence best supports the view that divorce may be either harmful or beneficial
to children, depending on the level of marital discord experienced in the marriage. While dissolving
low-discord marriages is harmful for children, dissolving marriages with higher levels of marital discord
is beneficial to them. For an excellent study reviewing existing research in favor of these propositions,
see generally Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and Children's
Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 71 (2001). Amato suggests that about half of children
are harmed by divorce and about half are helped. Id. at 93. For a summary of other studies on this point,
see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?: A Change in Culture for the Sake of the Children,
46 LA. B.J. 116, 117 (1998). See also RONALD L. SIMONS ET AL., UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN DIVORCED AND INTACT FAMILIES: STRESS INTERACTION AND CHILD OUTCOME 203-05
(1996); Rex Forehand, Lisa Armistead & Corinne David, Is Adolescent Adjustment Following Parental
Divorce a Function of Predivorce Adjustment?, 25 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 157 (1997).
281. Spaht, supra note 277, at 1554-55, 1557 (noting that these children suffer "educationally,
economically, physically, psychologically, or emotionally").
282. H. Patrick Stem et al., Professionals' Perceptions of Divorce Involving Children, 22 U. ARK.
LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 593 (2000) (noting that children of divorce experience psychological abuse, and
"children of high-conflict divorce may develop severe physical, cognitive, and emotional problems").
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divorce who remain in single parent families are also likely to experience
educational problems283 and poverty.284 As the Israeli Supreme Court has
recently remarked:
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the relationship between
the child and each of his parents .... From the viewpoint of the child,
separating him from one of his parents may even be regarded as
abandonment and affects his emotional development. Indeed, "the
welfare of children requires that they grow up with their father and
mother within the framework of a stable and loving family unit,
whereas the separation of parents involves a degree of separation
between one of the parents and his children."
285
Given the centrality of the family structure for children's development and
the potentially grave consequences of marital dissolution for children and thus
society at large, the state interest in child welfare is an essential factor in
shaping the precise contours and boundaries of the right to divorce. It thus
constitutes a "proper purpose" in light of which the extent and nature of
permissible divorce restrictions may be delineated.286
The state interest in protecting children requires, at a minimum,
mechanisms that induce thoughtful parental decisionmaking about divorce and
provide opportunities to resolve differences in troubled marriages. 287 A
relatively short limit on exit, such as a mandatory waiting period of six months,
could realize these objectives in a way that is mindful of the interests of
children without disproportionately curtailing parents' fundamental right to
divorce. In the same vein, for the sake of their children, parents may be
obligated to participate in special education and counseling sessions prior to
283. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 48-49 (1994).
284. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 46 (1988)
(noting the lack of poverty among children who live in intact families); ELAINE C. KAMARCK &
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, PUTrING CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE 1990S 12
(1990) ("It is no exaggeration to say that a stable, two-parent family is an American child's best
protection against poverty.").
285. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior
[2006] (not yet reported) (opinion of Barak, C.J., 28) (quoting LCA 4575/00 A v. B [2001] IsrSC
55(2) 321, 331).
286. Indeed, as Justice Cheshin explained, "[t]here are strong forces that are capable of affecting
the determination of the boundaries of the basic right in principle, and every interest ought to find its
proper place." HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Cheshin, J., 40). Following long-standing
beliefs, a line of scholarly voices has called for limits on the right to divorce based on the needs of
children, and some legislatures have followed suit by imposing stricter divorce standards on parents of
minors. See, e.g., TONY WRAGG, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 20-23 (4th ed. 1998); James Herbie
DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 927-31 (2000); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes:
A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reforms, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90 (1981); Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A Cautionary
Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1367, 1380 (1993).
287. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REV. 9, 44. (1990). Interestingly, even people who oppose restrictions on divorce do view favorably
such restrictions when they are imposed on couples with young children. See Scott, Divorce, Children 's
Welfare, and the Culture Wars, supra note 266, at 96.
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divorce, in order to explore both the possibility of keeping the marriage
together and the potential effects of divorce on their children.
288
That said, a constitutional regime committed to marital freedom must still
extend its protection to parents.289 While the state may impose certain limits on
the realization of the right to divorce, such limits may only extend so far.
290
Thus, any rule that always puts the interests of children above the parental right
to divorce is a constitutional impossibility, since it would radically impede the
parents' right to personal integrity and to pursue their own happiness by way of
marital emancipation. 29 1 Moreover, since divorce in situations of high marital
discord has proven healthier for children than recurrent exposure to their
parents' battles, 292 a categorical prohibition on divorce for couples with
children poorly serves the key state interest in child welfare. 293 Thus, while
certain restrictions on parents' rights to divorce may be permissible and even
desirable, a regime which infringes on the parents' core right to no-fault
divorce is still constitutionally improper.
Outside the context of couples with children, the constitutionality of
delaying divorce, through waiting periods or other means, is quite dubious.
294
Given that the right to divorce is integral to the individual right to family life,
and in view of the special weight and strength accorded to that guarantee in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, "a reduction thereof is possible only where it is
confronted by a conflicting value of special strength and importance. '" 295 A
divorce restriction is thus constitutionally warranted only if carefully tailored to
realize an "essential" and "urgent" social need, or a "major social interest."
296
This is not the case when a childless couple is involved, however. After all, the
parties are the best judges of the viability of their marriage. A state-imposed
waiting period, without an additional purpose, smacks at least somewhat of
paternalism 297 and flouts the historical lesson that "[i]f one party is unwilling to
288. Amato, supra note 280, at 91-93.
289. Indeed, while family law scholars disagree on the desirable scope of the right to divorce, the
overwhelming majority of scholars are united in their agreement that divorce should be available for
couples with children. See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "For the Sake of the Children ": A
Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435 (1992). But see supra note 286 for a handful of
scholars who call for a no-divorce regime for parents.
290. Chief Justice Barak has made this point in regards to human rights more generally. See HCJ
7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr (opinion of Barak, C.J., 57); see also Robert M. Gordon, The Limits of
Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998).
291. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 287, at 27-28.
292. See supra note 280.
293. See Amato, supra note 280, at 92 (concluding that divorce should be made easier rather than
stricter for parents as a means to protect children, and that in cases of violence or abuse, divorce should
be allowed to occur as expeditiously as possible).
294. Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers
Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT'L. J.L. POL. & FAM. 216, 221 (1997).
295. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Ctr. (opinion of Procaccia, J., 7).
296. Id.
297. See Richards, supra note 147, at 1011 ("No good argument can be made that paternalistic
considerations would justify interferences in basic choices such as whether to marry, bear children or be
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continue the relation there isn't any power on earth ... to make it a go."
298
Indeed, one Israeli family court has found that requiring consent to divorce is
offensive to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, since, insofar as marriage
requires mutual consent for its initiation, it must also enjoy the consent of both
parties for its continued existence.299 Attempts to force the continuation of a
marriage are even less realistic when the parties both desire dissolution.
A mandatory waiting period for childless couples also fails to meet the
proportionality test. The purpose underlying the waiting period-the state
interest in ensuring that marriages are not broken off lightly-is insufficient to
support restrictions in these circumstances, and can be adequately addressed by
means less offensive to fundamental rights. Thus, the deterrent effects of the
economic consequences of divorce, such as property settlements and alimony,
the embarrassment of public declaration of marital failure, and the emotional
cost of terminating so intimate a relationship are sufficient to serve well any
state interest in this regard without unnecessarily burdening marital liberty.
30 0
The second major problem with basing restrictions on consent, rather than
the presence of children, is that delaying consensual and childless divorce is
actually more restrictive than the current system, which allows immediate
dissolution when the divorce is consensual. For that matter, even when a
divorce is opposed, proof of fault on the part of the opposing spouse leads to
immediate divorce.30 1 Thus, this no-fault model leads to paradoxical results:
Women who are cheated on, cruelly mistreated, or deserted are in fact worse
off, since the six-month waiting period applies regardless of their husbands'
fault or consent. Worse, if a spouse contests the divorce, the injured party must
wait at least a year or more to obtain their freedom from the marriage.
Third, drawing distinctions based on consent encourages a practice similar
to get extortion. That is, parties may oppose the divorce as a vehicle to harass
one another or to attempt to gain concessions. As discussed above in Part II,
allowing the non-consent of a party to meaningfully impede his or her spouse's
ability to divorce disproportionately victimizes women who are usually the
heterosexual."); Scott, supra note 287, at 14 ("[Mlodem norms do not support paternalistic restrictions
on those divorces in which only the interests of two adults are at stake."). For a detailed examination of
the weakness of paternalistic justifications for the curtailment of fundamental lifestyle choices and
rights, see Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 619-20.
298. Poteet v. Poteet, 114 P.2d 91, 92 (N.M. 1941). Indeed, many accounts of modem divorce
emphasize the wide divergence between the formal rules for divorce and the actual behavior of litigants;
a reading of such accounts suggests that when a party desired dissolution, she got one no matter what the
divorce law on the books was. See, e.g., DAVIS & MJRCH, supra note 140; DIFONZO, supra note 165, at
10; RHODE, supra note 175, at 237; Robbins, supra note 266, at 190.
299. FC (BS) 15440/97 Pawajan v. Pawajan [1998] (not yet reported); see also FC (BS) 19240/98
Lavdanko v. Lavdanko [1999] (not yet reported).
300. Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 576.
301. This is true for fault regimes elsewhere. For a description of U.S. fault regimes, see Ellman,
supra note 294, at 218. No wonder, then, that under mixed-ground systems in England and the United
States, which provide both no-fault and fault grounds for dissolution, couples habitually resorted to the
fault option in order to bypass the no-fault waiting period and win a speedy ticket to freedom. Id. at 222.
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parties seeking dissolution. Further, it commodifies divorce and forces women,
in effect, to "pay" for the exercise of their constitutional rights, thus further
intensifying gender-based social and economic inequality.
302
Fourth, the suggested treatment of contested divorce is highly problematic.
Even in the case of unilateral divorce, a six-month waiting period satisfactorily
serves any state interest in requiring time for a couple to cool their emotions
and rationally consider reconciliation,30 3 and thus achieves the desired goals
without intruding upon dissolution rights more than is necessary. Given the
unsuccessful nature of extended waiting periods in previous divorce regimes,
30
4
and the potential psychological effects of such delays on both spouses and
children,30 5 a lengthier period-here, potentially up to two years-would
violate the proportionality prong of the Limitation Clause. It would also
disserve state interests. Imposing delays on divorce escalates the tension and
bitterness between the parties, jeopardizes their welfare, and exposes their
children to extended marital conflict, which in turn may increase their
children's behavioral and psychological difficulties.306 Hence, a long waiting
period withholds the only viable remedy for the evils of terminally-ill
marriages that also serves an interest in safeguarding the emotional and
physical well-being of all family members. Moreover, since divorce law is
unlikely to force people to remain emotionally connected within the marriage
or celibate outside of it,307 a waiting period for divorce often amounts merely to
a waiting period for remarriage. Given that remarriage may be highly beneficial
302. Research indicates that women's standards of living consistently decrease more than men's
after a divorce. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). Given this economic
reality, it is especially important that, in divorce proceedings, "neither [the] legal existence [of a non-
viable marriage] nor its related legal incidents should become weapons used to obtain revenge for the
breakdown or to extort a favorable settlement." Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in
Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 8 (Herma Hill Kay & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1990).
303. Wilkinson & White, supra note 149, at 576. While any time period is in some sense arbitrary,
a waiting period of six months is a reasonable estimate of the time necessary for these goals; because six
months provides sufficient time, it should be the upper limit of permissible delay. Going beyond the
minimum time required unnecessarily magnifies the couple's mental anguish and seems tainted by a
desire to deter couples from exercising their fundamental right rather than to help them reach a reasoned
decision.
304. Empirical examination of the history of extended waiting periods indicates that delays longer
than several months fail to divert divorce or improve marriage. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives
to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 39, 43-
45 (1997); DiFonzo, supra note 286, at 945-49.
305. See Scott, supra note 287, at 77 (noting the psychological harm of waiting periods on spouses
and potential economic costs on dependent spouses "if economic settlement is linked to the actual
divorce").
306. Marital discord has a tremendous negative influence on children's well-being, and the length
of exposure to marital conflict is positively correlated with behavioral and psychological difficulties.
See, e.g., Ayoub, Deutsch, & Maraganore, supra note 251, at 299-301; Ellman, supra note 294, at 222,
229.
307. See, e.g., WHITEHEAD, supra note 160, at 56; Ellman, supra note 294, at 223; Goldstein &
Gitter, supra note 200, at 80.
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for the divorced custodial parent and her children,308 a long waiting period not
only lacks proper constitutional purpose and proportionality, but also may be
counterproductive.
30 9
Fifth, this model's proposed judicial examination of the state of the
marriage after one year from the divorce application fails to pass constitutional
muster, because it violates the rights to marital and individual privacy. In fact,
requiring an inquiry into the entire substance of the marriage may even lead to
greater intrusions upon privacy than fault-based proceedings. 31 This inquiry,
under the IDI model, is concerned with the actual state of marriage and the
potential for reconciliation (or lack thereof), rather than the presence of a
discrete act of marital fault. Since proof of a single or even repeated marital
transgression may not be indicative of the state of the marriage, the IDI model
thus spurs a deeper inquiry into the private and most intimate details of marital
life. 3 11 Thus, while the fault-based inquiry fails to properly comprehend the full
picture of marital life, the deeper, more holistic inquiry called for under the IDI
model, with its concomitant intrusion of the judiciary into the bedroom and the
loss of individual privacy, is hardly an improvement from a constitutional
perspective. To avoid such an intrusion, courts in many countries view the act
of initiating divorce proceedings as itself demonstrating the irretrievable
breakdown of a marriage. 31 2 Indeed, a continued desire for divorce after a year-
long waiting period should provide more than sufficient reassurance that
reconciliation is impossible, without the need for a burdensome and intrusive
additional inquiry.
Finally, one caveat merits attention: the issue of judicial discretion. As a
constitutional matter, any divorce model must provide for immediate exit in
308. Ellman, supra note 294, at 221 & n.32. Note that women are usually the custodial parent after
divorce. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans "Are Not Carbon Copies" of White
Americans-The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 405,453 (1998).
309. DiFonzo, supra note 286, at 948-49 (finding that long waiting periods may "result in
preventing remarriage, promoting cohabitation with the possibility of out-of-wedlock births, enhancing
the likelihood that the spouse most anxious for the divorce will bargain away financial considerations,
and delaying the rebuilding of lives after the break-up of a marriage that is now 'legally intact but
factually dead' (footnotes omitted)).
310. See DiFonzo, supra note 286, at 896 (noting that a "'detailed inquest into the whole married
life would prove more distasteful and embarrassing' than the established [fault] proceedings") (citing
LAW COMM'N, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE: THE FIELD OF CHOICE Cmnd. 3123 (1966));
Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 200, at 78; supra Parts III.A, III.C. 1.
311. DiFonzo, supra note 286, at 892-96. DiFonzo analogizes such a judicial inquiry of marital
breakdown to a coroner's examination of "a corpse for clues to its demise," since the courts would have
to "conduct an inquest on each assertedly dead marriage to determine whether conjugal resuscitation
[were] possible." Id. at 894.
312. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 81 (1987) ("[The virtually universal understanding in practice is
that the breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable if one spouse says it is."); DiFonzo, supra note 286, at
895 (noting "the traditional reluctance of common law judges to engage in inquisitorial procedures");
Lifshitz, supra note 268, at 681-88, 699.
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cases of domestic violence or child abuse. 3 13 While the IDI model invests the
court with full discretion to expedite or delay the divorce proceedings as
necessary, it does not include a mandatory exemption from restrictions on the
divorce right where domestic violence is present. The limitations on judicial
discretion enforced by such an exemption are particularly important given the
prevalence of domestic violence as a cause of divorce, 314 and the ability of
batterers to engage in litigation to harass and intimidate their wives.
315
A study of rabbinical court decisions illustrates the potential dangers of
judicial discretion: It found many cases in which women who sought divorce
after suffering domestic violence were sent back to their abusers.316 For the
rabbinical court, violence is not necessarily a sufficient basis to compel a
husband to divorce his wife if that violence is not life-threatening. 317 The
history of the treatment of domestic violence in American family courts, in
which judicial intolerance for husbands' brutality was slow to develop, and
domestic violence was frequently an insufficient basis for divorce,
demonstrates the problems with leaving it to a court to decide whether
particular circumstances justify marital release.
318
But even beyond cases of child abuse or domestic violence, the broad
discretion conferred upon family law judges is constitutionally problematic. It
unjustifiably leaves the fundamental right to marital dissolution at the mercy of
313. In such situations, the right to divorce becomes a direct derivative of the constitutionally
protected guarantees to both life and physical integrity, the most fundamental of all rights. Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150 art. 2. In that capacity, only the most minimal restrictions
on the right to divorce may be constitutionally tolerable.
314. Schafran, supra note 258, at 59.
315. Reihing, supra note 260, at 394; Ver Steegh, supra note 251, at 161-62.
316. See Frishtic, supra note 24, at 100-10 (examining a representative sample of rabbinical court
decisions). In the cases analyzed in this study, the rabbinical court proved consistently reluctant to issue
orders, especially when violence was not habitual, but even when it was systematic and brutal. In some
cases when battered wives predicated their divorce petitions on several different grounds, the rabbinical
court ruled in favor of the wife based on other grounds rather than condemnation of violence. Thus,
when one woman asked for a divorce both because her husband secretly married a second wife and
because he had beat her nightly, strangled her, and spat on her, the court ordered divorce based on the
fact of the second marriage. Id. at 102-03.
317. Id. at 102, 109-11.
318. See David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic
Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 995, 1000-01 (2005)
(noting that, historically, domestic violence legislation was typically "applied only in the most egregious
circumstances involving severe injury"). Under the fault system, battered wives who had continued to
live with their husbands or had "provoked" their abuse, to name two examples, were forced to remain
married to their abusers. See RHODE, supra note 175, at 238. Even in the late twentieth century,
taskforce reports on gender bias in the courts identified patterns of trivialization of complaints and
disbelief of female petitioners, absent evidence of severe injuries. Id. at 241; Gender Bias Study of the
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 745, 750-52 (1990) [hereinafter Gender Bias].
The point is not that most twenty-first-century American judges, for example, undervalue the gravity of
domestic violence or treat it lightly. On the contrary, over the last two decades there has been a dramatic
shift in the treatment of domestic violence cases due to the growing awareness of the scope and
seriousness of this phenomenon. Jaros, supra, at 1000. Rather the past experiences of women in
American family courts is a reminder of the potential misuse of judicial discretion, particularly in a
context where such discretion serves no broader purpose.
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possibly conservative judges. These judges have the discretion to measure how
much conjugal suffering merits the redemption of divorce, and in doing so, may
simply sustain an empty marital shell. Indeed, in family law contexts, judicial
discretion has been exercised all too often to the detriment of women.
319
Scholarly literature has persuasively demonstrated that discriminatory and
stereotyped views of women and gender relations permeate many aspects of
judicial decisionmaking.
320
In sum, the IDI's vision of no-fault divorce, while moving in the right
constitutional direction, still suffers from significant flaws. It maintains a
distinction between consensual and disputed divorces, imposes a burdensome
waiting period, and requires too much judicial discretion and invasion of
privacy. The next model removes some of these barriers, but continues to rely
on the division between consensual and disputed divorce-which, as the next
section explains, is a constitutionality deal-breaker.
3. The Ministry of Justice Model: A Lenient No-Fault Variation
The proposal by the Ministry of Justice is a classic divorce-on-demand
model. 321 It provides an easy, barrier-free exit for consenting couples and a
lenient exit procedure with a brief six-month waiting period for spouses
seeking divorce without their partners' consent. 322 However, this model still
runs into constitutional problems, because, like the IDI model, it differentiates
between consensual and contested divorce, and requires mediation for all
couples seeking dissolution.
A constitutional divorce regime can differentiate between couples based on
the presence of children, but not on the presence or absence of consent to
divorce; further, such a regime must eliminate the bargaining chip of resisting
dissolution. Thus, the proposed regime is over-inclusive, as it delays the
freedom of childless spouses without vindicating any significant state interest
other than paternalistic interference to justify the curtailment of divorce
rights.323 It is also under-inclusive, as it allows a couple with minor children to
319. The problem of gender bias in the exercise of judicial discretion in family law matters has
been well documented. See, e.g,, Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered
Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 277 & n.23 (1992); see also HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2,
at 38-42; Gender Bias, supra note 318 (providing a comprehensive report of the effect of gender bias in
Massachusetts family courts).
320. EISLER, supra note 173, at 62; Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How
Stereotypes About Women Influence Judges, 24" JUDGES J. 12, 12-17, 48-52 (1985); Schafran, supra note
258, at 42,45-46.
321. See generally GOODE, supra note 142 (providing a comprehensive review of divorce regimes
worldwide).
322. Bill Determining the Status of Couples Entering into a Spousal Covenant 2004 arts. 8(a)(2),
9(b), as reprinted in LIFSHITZ, supra note 62, at 97-105.
323. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 200, at 83. If this model's underlying rationale in delaying a
couple's marital freedom is double-checking whether the marriage is irretrievably broken, it is futile and
cannot justify restrictions on the right to divorce. See supra Part III.C. I.
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end their marriage immediately, 324 without regard for the potential of a limited
waiting period to lead to meaningful exercise of the divorce right and
encourage reconciliation attempts.
325
In addition, the Ministry of Justice model requires the parties to undergo
some form of mediation to resolve their disputes before a divorce may be
326granted. Since the nature and particulars of the procedure are not clear in the
proposal, it is difficult to assess its constitutionality. 327  Nonetheless,
international examples of mediation bring up concerns that the Israeli
legislature must address if such a provision is to be constitutionally permissible.
The United States has a long history of experimentation with divorce
mediation, 32  accompanied by an acute controversy over the fairness and
efficiency of this process.329 One major concern is mediation's role in
reinforcing power imbalances within a marriage: When the process empowers
the already-stronger spouse (usually the husband), mediation tends to cause
additional harm to women. 33  Women in divorce mediation may also be
impacted by social pressure and stereotypes, suffer from greater economic risk,
possess less information about legal rights and marital assets, and feel more
324. In these cases, it may be advisable to allow divorce even before the end of the statutory period
currently required for non-consenting couples, if and when mutually satisfactory financial and custodial
arrangements are concluded. For a proposal in this spirit, see Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 200, at 76.
It would encourage spouses to cooperate for the sake of their children, but does not risk the use of
unnecessary pressure against any of the parties, since, with only a minimal and temporary limitation on
dissolution, the party with less desire to divorce has no significant power to force an unfavorable
agreement in exchange for freedom. This approach strikes a proper constitutional balance between
human fights and state interests.
325. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 287, at 76-78 (listing the benefits of waiting periods before
divorce). Such a mechanism will better serve the institution of marriage and the family, which are both
fundamental in the Israeli society and legal system. See supra Parts 11, II1.B.2.
326. Divorce mediation is a process through which an impartial third-party mediator facilitates the
resolution of family disputes by voluntary settlement. See Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation: The Symposium on Standards of Practice, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 121, 127 (2001)
[hereinafter Model Standards]; Dennis P. Saccuzzo, Controversies in Divorce Mediation, 79 N.D. L.
REV. 425,428 (2003).
327. Mediation programs vary widely along several policy dimensions, yet the bill does not clearly
define the term. See Definitions Clause, Bill Determining the Status of Couples Entering into a Spousal
Covenant 2004, as reprinted in LIFSHITZ, supra note 62; see also Judith M. Wolf, Sex, Lies, and Divorce
Mediation, 33 ARIZ. ATT'Y 24, 25 (1996) (noting that while "divorce mediation is undoubtedly one of
the fastest-growing areas of alternative dispute resolution ... [i]t is probably also the least understood").
328. See, e.g., Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation
Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 989, 991 (2000); Lydia Belzer, Domestic Abuse and
Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for a Safer Process, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 43 (2003); Karl
Kirkland, Advancing ADR in Alabama: 1994-2004: Efficacy of Post-Divorce Mediation and Evaluation
Services, 65 ALA. LAW. 186, 187 (2004).
329. Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV.
1317, 1323-29 (1995). For information on the benefits of divorce mediation in the United States, see
Model Standards, supra note 326, at 127; Kenneth J. Rigby, Alternate Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1725, 1744-45 (1984).
330. See, e.g., Gagnon, supra note 319, at 272-73; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-51 (1991).
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
compelled to forgo their financial rights for the sake of obtaining favorable
custody rights. 331 Critics lament that divorce mediation
thus perpetuates patriarchy by freeing men to use their power to gain
greater control over children, to implant more awareness of male
dominance into women's consciousness, and to retain more of the
marital financial assets .... [T]hose who structure court affiliated
programs, as well as mediators, now should recognize their complicity
in the continued oppression of women and their dependent children.
33
The inequality that may be reinforced by mediation is particularly severe
when one party has physically abused the other; the unequal bargaining power
in that situation may be so potent as to neutralize a woman's ability to protect
her liberty and property rights.333 Moreover, since the violence tends to
intensify during separation, 334 merely attending mediation sessions may be
risky for abused spouses.335 In fact, a number of battered women have been
murdered by their estranged abusers when they came to the courthouse.
33 6
Mediation may also have the potential to exacerbate conflict and abuse, as
studies find that it leads to more incidents of post-proceeding abuse than a trial
does. 3 3 7 These risks to battered women's personal safety and overall interests
have unsurprisingly led their advocates to overwhelmingly oppose mediation as
a dispute resolution mechanism.
338
331. Gender Bias, supra note 318, at 747, 772; Saccuzzo, supra note 326, at 433; see also Penelope
E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 523
(1992).
332. Bryan, supra note 331, at 523.
333. Gender Bias, supra note 318, at 773 (noting that "a woman will be willing to take less to get
out of the situation because of the danger" and that she will not be "looking out for her long-term
financial interest"); see also Yelena Ayrapetova, HB 004: Mandatory Divorce Mediation Program
Passed in Utah, 7 J. L. FAM. STUD. 417, 419 (2005); Gagnon, supra note 319, at 280; Colleen N. Kotyk,
Tearing Down the House: Weakening the Foundation of Divorce Mediation Brick by Brick, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 277, 300 (1997); James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still:
Unfulfilled Promises of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 1149,
1186 (1995) (noting that, by ignoring abusers' coercive power, mediation may perpetrate second-order
abuse on victims).
334. Karla Fischer et al., Procedural Justice Implications of ADR in Specialized Contexts: The
Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117,
2138-39 (1993).
335. See, e.g., LINDA GIRDNER, ABA CR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, DOMESTIC ABUSE AND
CUSTODY MEDIATION TRAINING FOR JUDGES AND ADMINISTRATORS: INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE 12 (1999);
Holly Joyce, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 447, 452-53 (1997) (noting that the pressure in mediation to agree to generous visitation rights
may give the abuser more access to his victim outside of proceedings); Ren6 L. Rimelspach, Mediating
Family Disputes in a World with Domestic Violence: How To Devise a Safe and Effective Court-
Connected Mediation Program, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95, 98 (2001).
336. Beck & Sales, supra note 328, at 997.
337. Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 43, 55 (1995). For a concise summary of further arguments against mediating cases involving
domestic violence, see Belzer, supra note 328, at 45-53; Rimelspach, supra note 335, at 96-99.
338. See Gagnon, supra note 319, at 272-73; see also Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to
Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 433 (1985).
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Given women's often-disadvantaged position in divorce mediation, as well
as the dangers associated with the process, it is constitutionally dubious at best
to condition the exercise of the right to divorce on participation, and clearly
impermissible when domestic violence is involved. The fear of confronting
their abusers in the unequal setting of mediation, and requiring them to bargain
over custody and visitation rights under such conditions, may force women to
forgo the exercise of their right to divorce altogether. 339 Given the extremely
high rates of abuse against wives seeking divorce, 340 this potential barrier to
marital liberty could jeopardize the right to divorce for numerous women.
Divorce mediation thus poses a danger to women's equality and divorce
rights and, at times, their bodily integrity-all of which are protected under the
Israeli Constitution. 34 1 Moreover, since divorce mediation may perpetuate
unequal bargaining power between spouses, it may further deprive women,
usually the less powerful party, of their fair share of marital property.3 42 Since
this dispossession takes place in mediation, women are not only deprived of
their property, but also of their day in court and the concurrent rules and
formality of adversarial proceedings that might ensure a fair and impartial
outcome.343 Since both due process and property rights are safeguarded under
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, such results are constitutionally
problematic as well as harmful to women.
344
If the model requires spouses to pay for their mandatory mediation before
gaining access to divorce, further constitutional problems arise, because
exercising the right to divorce would be beyond the reach of those who could
not afford the fee on top of the other costs associated with divorce. 345 One
commentator cautioned:
339. Belzer, supra note 328, at 50-51; Leigh Goodmark, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Potentialfor Gender Bias, 39 JUDGES J. 21, 22 (2000).
340. In the United States, estimates indicate that one out of four women seeking dissolution has
been physically abused. Gagnon, supra note 319, at 273. In Israel, statistics providing the exact
prevalence of domestic violence are difficult to find. Moderate statistics estimate that one out of every
seven women has been subject to domestic violence. See The Phenomenon of Domestic Violence in
Israel, http://www.wizo.org/women-violent-go.asp?catid=50 (last visited Dec. 17, 2008). For facts and
figures about gender-based domestic violence, see HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 2, at 196-97.
341. The rights to life and bodily integrity are explicitly protected under article three of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150. The right to equality is an unenumerated right derived from
the concept of human dignity throughout the Basic Law. See supra Part II.B.
342. For additional information on due process and property violations stemming from divorce
mediation in the U.S. context, see Kotyk, supra note 333, at 292-307.
343. Id. at 300, 308.
344. The right to property is explicitly protected under article three of Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150. For the constitutional status of due process under Israeli law, see the
decision of Judge Menachem Klein in CA [TA] 156232/05 Hertzeliya Municipality v. Hadara Sales
Vardiman [2005], available at http://www.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titles.asp?build=2&System=l&Exec
=&cpq=l.
345. In a similar situation, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated even an economically-modest
barrier to divorce-a sixty dollar non-waivable filing fee-as an unconstitutional bar to accessing
divorce court and the ability to adjust a "fundamental human relationship." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
2009]
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Particularly in divorce cases, when partners are setting up two
households on the same income that formerly supported only one,
money is tight. Divorcing parties who are mandated to use and pay for
mediation services may be unduly pressured to settle on unacceptable
terms because they cannot afford to pay lawyers' fees for trial or
further negotiation, in addition to the fees they have been forced to
spend for mediation.
346
Additionally, because equal division of mediation fees has a
disproportionately harsh effect on those partners, usually women, with fewer
economic resources, it may fail to protect their constitutional right to
equality.347 Required fees could even lead women under monetary strain to rush
to end the expensive process and agree to unfavorable settlements for financial
reasons.
34 8
Despite the many potential constitutional pitfalls to a divorce mediation
scheme, the process can, and should, survive if enacted with great care.
349
Constitutionally sound implementations of divorce mediation must respect each
party's fundamental right to divorce, equality, due process, and property, and
give special attention to ensuring fairness to women, who are often
disproportionately at risk in the process. To begin with, divorce mediation must
be voluntary rather than mandated by the state, 350 and parties must have the
opportunity to learn about the process (and its alternatives) and to withdraw at
anytime. 351 Voluntary participation coupled with an "escape hatch mechanism"
alleviates constitutional concerns, 352 since the law would not force anyone who
could be harmed by mandatory mediation to use the process.
In order to further minimize abridgments of women's fundamental rights,
the legislature should establish screening procedures and statutory guidelines
346. King, supra note 250, at 382.
347. For a discussion of this point in the U.S. context, see id. at 455-58.
348. Id. at 456.
349. Developing a mediation process that lives up to constitutional requirements is important
because mediation potentially offers many benefits, including promoting effective and amicable
resolution of divorce disputes, facilitating communication, encouraging understanding, and reducing
hostility and trauma to couples and their children. See, e.g., Model Standards, supra note 326, at 127
(describing mediation as a way to reduce costs, increase participants' self-determination, and act in the
best interest of children); Rigby, supra note 329, at 1744-45 (listing the perceived advantages of the
mediation process); Patricia L. Sullivan, Culture, Divorce, and Family Mediation in Hong Kong, 43
FAM. CT. REv. 109, 116 (2005) (describing benefits of mediation as reported by participants in a Pilot
Scheme mediation study). Many believe that these benefits more than make up for any potential for
harm and may make mediation an effective process for women despite gender-based power imbalances.
Rimelspach, supra note 335, at 104; see also Diane Neumann, How Mediation Can Effectively Address
the Male-Female Power Imbalance in Divorce, 9 MEDIATION Q 227, 228-29 (1992) (describing the role
of mediators in affecting imbalances). The mediation process does not violate parties' constitutionally-
guaranteed right to privacy, found in article seven of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H.
150, because, unlike divorce proceedings, the process does not require bringing details of relationships
into public view. Gagnon, supra note 319, at 274.
350. Kotyk, supra note 333, at 307-08.
351. See GIRDNER, supra note 335, at 18-19.
352. Kotyk, supra note 333, at 291, 307-08.
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for the qualifications, training, and conduct of mediators. Such mechanisms
would serve to ensure a fair process and address women's unequal position in
mediation and the possible violation of their rights to life, bodily integrity,
property, and equality.353 Relevant regulations should include the presence of
both male and female mediators, 354 general instruction to be vigilant for power
imbalances and to conduct negotiations so as to equalize power relationships
between parties (especially by ensuring equal access to necessary
information),355 and requirements to terminate proceedings if power imbalances
become too great. 356 Such regulations are designed to contribute to the
equalization of the parties' positions and thus to safeguard women's rights.
357
Further, to avoid the barrier to the right to divorce erected through party-
paid divorce mediation schemes, public funding must be available for
mediation. Such financing would alleviate the disparate impact that mandated
payment of mediation has on women and prevent associated economically-
based settlement pressure. 358 Additionally, requiring judicial review of
settlements in order to bar those that are so unjust as to offend basic
sensibilities could alleviate due process concerns by providing access to the
court system in extreme cases.
Most importantly, cases of domestic violence require separate treatment. In
order to avoid the danger and unfairness of divorce mediation to abuse
survivors, nearly all U.S. jurisdictions prohibit mediation when domestic
violence is involved.359 To retain constitutional legitimacy, the Ministry of
Justice model must be amended to follow this example by specifically
exempting cases involving domestic violence from mediation.
Any other approach may call into question the constitutional legitimacy of
mediation as a tool of divorce regulation. Abused wives facing divorce and all
of its associated difficulties must not and cannot be forced to risk their
fundamental rights to physical and psychological safety or marital property in
order to exercise their fundamental right to divorce. At the very least, the
353. See, e.g., Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation: An
Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 19-20 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds.,
1988). For a survey of mediators' duties regarding fairness, see McEwen, Rogers & Maiman, supra note
329, at 1333-36.
354. Wolf, supra note 327, at 25.
355. This is, for instance, the law in California. See McEwen, Rogers & Maiman, supra note 329,
at 1333. Since power imbalances are often data or information inequalities, it is important that the
mediator discuss with the less-informed party how best to obtain information and that the less-informed
party be able to review financial information with professionals. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 327, at 33-
34.
356. John Haynes, Power Balancing, in DIVORCE MEDIATION, supra note 353, at 277, 280-81; see
also Belzer, supra note 328, at 52.
357. See Belzer, supra note 328, at 52; Haynes, supra note 356, at 280-81; McEwen, Rogers &
Maiman, supra note 329, at 1333; Wolf, supra note 327, at 25, 33-34.
358. King, supra note 250, at 460.
359. Belzer, supra note 328, at 43; Carrie-Anne Tondo et al., Mediation Trends, 39 FAM. CT. REV.
431, 445 (2001) (providing mediation chart of the states); Ver Steegh, supra note 251, at 192.
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legislation should grant abused spouses the ability to choose whether to go
through mediation, making it possible only if requested by the victim360 and
adequate safety options are in place.361 Thus, screening for domestic violence
must be part of the process in order to eliminate the cases from mediation, or
safety measures must be included to protect battered women from further
36236abuse. Given victims' underreporting of abuse,363 in order to protect the
rights to bodily integrity and life, the rule should require ending mediation if it
would threaten the mental or physical health or safety of either of the parties or
their children.
Crafting an appropriate mediation provision is especially important
because not only the process but also the results of mediation impact the right
to divorce. If mediation fails, the Ministry of Justice model permits the court to
withhold divorce until property and custody proceedings are concluded, no
matter how long they last. This essentially amounts to an additional waiting
period for divorce, and thus suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as
the delays discussed above. Specifically, the provision fails to justify its
excessive burden on the right to divorce based on the proper purpose and
proportionality prongs of the Limitation Clause: It mainly serves to pressure the
party desiring dissolution into unfavorable arrangements (hardly a "proper
purpose"), and it deprives couples of marital freedom for extended or undefined
periods of time at the discretion of particular judges.
364
In addition, any divorce model must keep the availability of divorce
entirely separate from the financial pressures associated with marital
dissolution. As observed, conditioning divorce on the conclusion of the
property proceedings places an unjustified limitation on the exercise of the
right to divorce. But further, it is constitutionally unjustifiable to impede
360. See, e.g., MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 407 (Nat'l Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges 1994); Gagnon, supra note 319, at 291. Although the legislature can
and should protect battered women's fundamental rights, it should not force this protection upon them.
If other women are allowed to participate in mediation and to enjoy its myriad benefits, it is both
discriminatory and paternalistic to deprive abuse victims of this option if they want it. See Nancy
Thoennes et al., Mediation and Domestic Violence: Current Policies and Practices, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 6, 8 (1995); see also Belzer, supra note 328, at 54.
361. For example, the mediator should have experience and training related to domestic violence
and should meet with each spouse separately and discuss both the reasons for the victim's participation
in mediation and safety options and protective orders. See Gagnon, supra note 319, at 278; Ver Steegh,
supra note 251, at 191.
362. Rimelspach, supra note 335, at 104; see also WIS. STAT. § 767.11(8)(b) (2001) (providing
rules to end mediation in cases where it would be harmful to parties). Commentators also describe
screening as "the most important stage in divorce mediation for discovering abuse cases and rooting out
those which do not belong in mediation." Belzer, supra note 328, at 55.
363. Alexandra Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening Method for
Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 253, 268-69.
364. Past actions of the rabbinical court are indicative of the danger in this model. When parties
could not reach an agreement in divorce proceedings, the court would often pressure the wife into
submitting to her husband's demands. See supra Part I.B. Under that system, proceedings may be
prolonged "without time limit." See First Legal Aid, http://www.odnet.co.il/heb/frmlndex.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2008).
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divorce in the name of women's economic interests.365 Making it more difficult
to divorce for the sake of financial considerations would run counter to the
Israeli Constitution: both the "fitness" subtest, insisting on a rational
relationship between legislative means and ends, and the "minimal harm"
subtest, allowing for only the least restrictive measures when in the zone of
constitutionally-guaranteed fundamental rights, would go unmet. While
protection of the financially vulnerable spouse is indeed a compelling interest,
this legislative end must be served through property and alimony rules, which
are more appropriate to secure just consequences of marital dissolution than the
laws governing divorce itself.
366
All in all, the Ministry of Justice's model demonstrates that a no-fault basis
for divorce is necessary, yet not sufficient, to ensure the constitutional propriety
of a divorce regime. While this model requires adjustment to fully protect
women's fundamental rights in general and to divorce in particular, it includes
basic provisions, like mediation, which, if properly implemented, would meet
constitutional requirements and benefit divorcing couples on their way to
marital freedom.
CONCLUSION
Israel is unique. It is the only democracy in the Middle East, the only
Jewish state on earth, and the only country with a solely religious divorce
regime and a uniquely activist judiciary that created a constitution. 367 The
Israeli constitutional revolution with respect to the status of human rights is
perhaps unfinished, imperfect, or undesirable, but it is a living fact-and it
must be the basis for reform of that singular divorce regime. Twenty-first
century Israel enjoys a formal constitutional system accompanied by American-
style judicial review. A significant number of rights have been transformed into
365. This is currently a popular theme in U.S. jurisprudence. See WEITZMAN, supra note 302, at
323 (finding a disparity in consequences of no-fault divorce for men and women) and the enormous
research literature that followed. For a survey of such research, see ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT
DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 83-87 (1992). For criticism of Weitzman, see, for example, Review
Symposium on Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 757 (1986); and Jana B.
Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989).
366. Ellman, supra note 294, at 224, 230. This state interest could be addressed through much more
tailored and effective means, such as reform of property law or improvement of employment
opportunities or even adoption of a spousal post-divorce maintenance system along the lines of alimony,
which is still unheard of in the Israeli legal system. See Cahn, supra note 200, at 254, 336. As important
as a discussion of desirable post-divorce financial arrangements is, it falls beyond the scope of this
piece. For examples of exploration of this point by U.S. family law scholars, see generally Trevor S.
Blake, You Get What You Pay For: A New Feminist Proposal for Allocating Marital Property upon
Divorce, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 889 (2003); Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce:
Would Adoption of the ALl Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119
(2001); Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J.
51 (1998-1999).
367. See supra Part II.A.
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fundamental rights, endowed with formal constitutional recognition and supra-
legislative status. Marital dissolution, I argue, ought to be amongst them.
To this day, Israel remains the only modem state where civil marriage and
divorce are nonexistent.368 While Israel's judges have threatened to create civil
marriage and divorce if the legislature refuses to do so,369 neither legislative nor
judicial action has been taken, so a discriminatory, limited, fault-based divorce
regime remains the sole outlet. Looking forward to the day when that action
actually occurs, this study seeks to further the development and understanding
of Israeli divorce and constitutional law in order to facilitate the
implementation of constitutional mandates in the divorce arena. In
reinterpreting, reforming, and reframing her divorce law, Israel must take into
account the constraints that the constitutional status of divorce would impose
on her legislative latitude.
The art of crafting a constitutionally-satisfactory divorce regime is both
delicate and complicated. It requires careful tailoring and perceptive weighing
of the rival interests demanding their constitutional due, and the legislature
undoubtedly faces a challenging and ambitious undertaking. If the task is
accomplished properly, Israeli citizens could enjoy a divorce regime that
alleviates, or at least does not exacerbate, the anxiety, complications, and
trauma associated with divorce. My underlying objective has thus been to
enrich the Israeli discourse by proposing tools designed to rectify the injustices
of the current law and to delineate the foundational principles that will serve as
the cornerstone of the new or additional divorce regime.
The ideal constitutional divorce regime must have at its center some vision
of no-fault divorce. This regime would be the least restrictive means to both
further state interests and vindicate individual rights to dissolution, dignity,
privacy, and equality, especially for women. This ideal regime would include a
mandatory, yet reasonable, waiting period for reflection and reconciliation,
followed by the ability to divorce without proving fault or justifying motives.
Any other system would prove overly intrusive and damaging to those seeking
to end their marriages and reorder their lives, and would only increase the
number of marriages that are "legally alive but factually dead.,
370
Israel is only one step short of bestowing upon its citizens divorce laws that
are respectful of human rights, as befits a constitutional democracy. It is hoped
that this analysis will aid both family-law scholars and policymakers in crafting
the divorce regime that Israeli women have craved since the State's inception.
368. Lemer, supra note 3, at 252 (quoting Yoram Schachar, History and Sources ofIsraeli Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 1, 3 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995)); see
also Gidon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks To
Avoid? The Israeli Controversy Over Who Is a Jew As an Illustration, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1233, 1260 (2006) (noting that Israel has only religious marriage).
369. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 44, at 154 (noting Chief Justice Aharon Barak's speech "Law in
Israel in the Next Millennium" from Jan. 3, 1999).
370. ElIman, supra note 294, at 225.
[Vol. 20:441
2009] Unchaining the Agunot 503
If the legislature rises to the challenge and accepts a constitutional key-the
right to marital liberty-the opportunity to unlock women's marital chains may
finally be within reach.

